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ABSTRACT
Keywords: service-based manufacturing, manufacturing service provider, risk
assessment, simulation
The practice o f service-based manufacturing, utilized in various industries, especially in 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and automotive, is on a rise as it enables increased 
enterprise effectiveness in dynamic contexts [1].
In such scenario, two different actors can often be distinguished: the End User (EU) and 
the Manufacturing Service Provider (MSP). Depending on the nature o f the 
manufacturing service supplied and the relative power o f the two parties, the MSP has to 
consider various risk factors, which can potentially jeopardize its success with the 
contract.
This thesis describes a risk assessment approach for the contractual relationship o f an 
MSP and an EU, in the three most risky scenarios. The effects o f the risk factors on the 
success o f the relationship are stochastically simulated and the simulation results are 
analyzed. The developed framework can be utilized by the suppliers o f different 
manufacturing services to help them with their risk assessment and management 
activities.
in
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CHAPTER1 1ntroduction
1.1 General Overview
1.1.1 Service-based Manufacturing
Today’s markets in many industrial sectors have reached such an unprecedented high 
degrees o f volatility, competitiveness, and globalization, that it has made many traditional 
manufacturing paradigms and business models, such as vertical integration and mass 
production, practically infeasible. Leasing manufacturing related services, including not 
only manufacturing itself but also other services such as product design, process design, 
research and development, after-sales services, and maintenance, is a quite new solution 
which has proved to be successful in different market sectors, especially in electronics, 
automotive and pharmaceuticals.
In general, two main actors can be identified in a service-based setting [14]:
• The End User (EU) who interacts with the market of finished goods as a market 
supplier. The EU’s core business is its interaction with the market itself. The EU often 
adds its value to the product through innovation, design, marketing and branding.
• The Manufacturing Service Provider (MSP), who is made responsible for the 
manufacturing response to the market and for customization. Its core business, then, is 
manufacturing itself, which allows concentrating on the needed competencies and, 
consequently, increasing effectiveness. The MSP has to acquire, operate and maintain
1
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the manufacturing facility [ 1 ].
The MSP may be known under various names, such as, for example, Contract Research 
Organization (CRO), Contract Manufacturer (CM), Electronic Manufacturing Service 
(EMS), Contract Design Manufactures (CDM), or Original Design Manufacturer (ODM), 
among others, and have different functionalities[14]. In some cases, the MSP is even 
handed over everything from design to fulfillment [18].
Leasing a manufacturing related service provides the EU with considerable savings and 
cost reduction mainly as it requires no investment and capital tied in physical assets and 
allows it to focus on its core competencies and improve its agility [1]. According to a 
survey of companies in U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe, top five reasons o f 
outsourcing operations are:
• Achieving best practices,
• Access to new technologies and skills,
• Cost discipline and control,
• Improve service quality, and
• Focus on core competencies [20].
This probably justifies why many well-known companies, such as, for example, HP, 
Microsoft, and Ericson [18], are among the extensive users o f manufacturing services.
The MSP, on the other hand, can enjoy better capacity utilization, expertise and 
knowledge accumulation, economy o f scale and scope, and ability to smoothen demand 
fluctuations across several clients [2], Thus, new generations o f companies which are 
suppliers o f different manufacturing services have emerged in the last couple o f decades,
2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
such as, for example, Flextronics (electronics), Ideo (design), Delphi (automotive), and 
Foxconn (electronics).
The inter-firm relationship o f the two actors is governed by a contract signed for a 
defined time horizon [14]. Each actor typically has to manage a large number o f contracts 
signed with different parties. This is especially important for the MSPs as they often have 
to handle a large number o f contracts signed with different EUs each with different 
requirements, power, and located in a different part o f the world.
1.1.2 Risk Assessment and Management
There is no doubt that risk management is an integral part o f every decision making 
process as uncertainty is an integral part o f life. Uncertainty of decision outcomes and the 
decision making environment can lead to risk, the potential o f loss [7]. The categories of 
uncertainty (Table 1) provide a better understanding o f various uncertainties involved in 
different projects.
To be more precise, risk can be defined as “a measure of probability and severity of 
adverse effects” [15]. In other words, risk is “a concept that denotes a potential negative 
impact to an asset or some characteristic o f value that may arise from some present 
process or future event” [22].
3
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Table 1. Managerial categories for uncertainty [28]
Type o f Uncertainty Definition
In time Uncertainty about when certain events may occur or 
the ability to react to them
In control Inadequate authority to make or influence decisions or 
inconsistency in processes
In information Inadequate or inaccurate information on which 
decisions are based
“Risk Assessment” involves identifying sources of potential harms, assessing the 
likelihood o f their occurrence and consequences [22]. In fact, the main focus o f “Risk 
Assessment” is finding answers to the following questions:
What can go wrong?
What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?
What are the consequences?[15]
“Risk Analysis” is any qualitative or quantitative method used for assessing the impacts 
of risks on decision situations [29], On the other hand, “Risk Management” involves 
finding ways to mitigate these consequences through evaluating possible alternatives and 
their associated trade-offs in terms of all potential costs, benefits and risks [15]. Risk 
management can be carried out through different activities, and the following are usually 
considered as typical risk management activities:
Risk mitigation - risk reduction - preventative measures that can be implemented for 
some risks to significantly reduce the probability of the risk occurring.
4
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Risk mitigation - impact reduction - involves reducing the impacts o f the risks in case 
preventing the risk from happening is not possible.
Contingency planning - plans for how to survive a problem. Contingency plans say what 
is to be done after the risks are actualized. A particularly important form of contingency 
plan is a disaster recovery plan [30].
The practice o f “Total Risk Management (TRM)” covers both “Risk Assessment” and 
“Risk Management” and addresses a set o f four sources for failure within a hierarchical- 
multi-objective framework. These four sources o f failure are hardware failure, software 
failure, organizational failure, and human failure [15].
One means of managing risks is to characterize risky scenarios and identify the factors in 
those scenarios. To analyze these scenarios, first, the contributing factors have to be 
identified and quantified. Then, these risk factors can be arranged in different scenarios 
and, by propagating their uncertainties, can be related to system outcomes [7].
In general, risk management models can be classified into two categories:
Classical models which involve statistical analysis. Examples o f classical models are 
Monte Carlo simulation and influence diagrams, and
Conceptual models which incorporate fuzzy set analysis. An example o f conceptual 
models is fuzzy sets [27].
Holistic Risk Management [9] is a rather new and more comprehensive process which 
differs from conventional Risk Management in two ways:
It considers all the risks which threaten the objectives of an organization and not only 
those which are ‘insurable’ or ‘fortuitous’.
5
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It considers minimizing risk and the impact o f risk as a main management function which 
must be an integral part o f everyone’s job within an organization.
Holistic Risk Management takes into account risk such as, for example, risks threatening 
an organization’s brand value, and public and trade reputation as well as the 
organization’s intellectual property, legal rights and employees and risks associated with 
the wide usage o f IT in today’s world such as computer crashes [9] which are inevitable 
risk factors in today’s digital world.
1.2 Proposed Research
1.2.1 Motivations of the proposed research
Managing the life cycle o f the signed contracts is a high priority for any company and a 
high percentage o f executive managers believe that their top pressure is to better assess 
and mitigate external (supplier and customer) and internal risks [19]. A manufacturing 
service contract is no exception and requires special attention to risk assessment and 
mitigation activities to be managed effectively. In fact, outsourcing and utilizing service- 
based manufacturing strategies are, in essence, adopted to manage risks o f investment, 
technological changes and supply chain risks.
This is especially important for the MSP as it has to make extensive investments in 
capacity and human resources and has to work with maximum efficiency to keep its 
service attractive to the EUs and be profitable, at the same time. It has to do more than 
simply reducing labor costs by moving production to low-wage areas, which incorporates 
its own risks. The MSP has to take advantage o f technologies such as, for example, 
reconfigurable manufacturing, leveraging the modularity (both hardware and software)
6
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and standardization [1]. Moreover, a single MSP has multiple contracts with multiple 
clients each having different degrees o f relative power and requirements.
In order to be able to asses and mitigate risks associated with the supply of manufacturing 
related services, the MSP has to consider both its internal and external risk factors. A risk 
assessment framework is required to help the MSP identify the risk factors, determine 
their inter-relationships and asses their probability o f occurrence and negative impacts in 
a standard systematic way.
Risk assessment and management literature related to this research is primarily focused 
on software development and construction projects. While a fair amount o f the methods 
and risk factors discussed in the literature ([10][9][7][11][15][17]) are also relevant to 
MSPs, as the nature o f manufacturing services is different and unique, a new framework 
for identifying and assessing the effects o f its associated risk factors is required. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the service supplier, or the software development team, 
and its relative power and the service under contract, which give rise to certain risk 
factors, are not considered in the literature.
1.2.2 Assumptions of the proposed research
This thesis is going to provide a general framework for the supplier o f manufacturing 
services (MSP) to perform quantitative risk analysis through identifying, assessing, and 
mathematically modeling the external risk factors associated with a supply contract 
regarding supply o f a given manufacturing service for a given EU.
The proposed framework considers the attributes o f the contracted service and the 
parties’ relative balance o f power as the root causes of risk factors and follows a
7
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hierarchical holistic approach to evaluate the MSP’s chances o f success with a given 
contract. Using Monte Carlo simulation, the developed stochastic mathematical model is 
simulated and analyzed for numerical examples.
The conducted analysis can be used to devise risk intervention and mitigation plans as 
part o f the risk management process. The outcomes o f the devised risk intervention and 
mitigation plans can be also evaluated by adjusting the developed model using new 
parameters for the simulated examples.
Note that, in our model, we only consider risks o f the contractual relationship o f the MSP 
with the EU. MSP’s internal risk factors, which are present regardless of its contractual 
commitment to the EU, such as general managerial challenges or incorrect strategic 
choices, are not taken into account.
Moreover, other external risk factors related to MSP’s suppliers or environment are not 
considered. However, incorporating these risk factors in the model is quite straight 
forward. Also, a stochastic mathematical model is only developed for the three riskiest 
scenarios. Nevertheless, generalizing the model and using that for other scenarios is also 
possible and straightforward.
1.2.3 Applications of the Proposed Model
The developed model can be o f great help to MSPs’ executives before and after bidding 
or signing off contracts with their clients. It provides a far-sighted holistic tool which 
helps identifying, modeling and assessing the impacts of risk factors on the MSP’s 
success with the contract and improves Contract Lifecycle Management (CLM) process.
Contract or risk managers can use the developed model to have a clear understanding o f
8
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their position, relative to their clients, and categorize the service they are committing to 
deliver and the risk factors they are probably going to face. Such understanding will help 
them make better choices about the type o f the contract, and be more proactive while 
negotiating the terms o f the contract. Moreover, such framework model will make the 
risk managers better able to evaluate and predict the efficiency o f their risk mitigation 
and risk management plans.
In summary, the proposed model will help the managers o f manufacturing- service 
suppliers efficiently perform risk assessment and analysis and, therefore, be able to be 
more efficient at risk management.
9
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CHAPTER2 Review of literature
2.1 Service-based Manufacturing
Service-based manufacturing can be considered as an extension o f traditional 
outsourcing. Outsourcing emerged as a popular operational strategy in the 1990s and 
research on it started at about the same time. Since outsourcing IT/IS related activities is 
now an almost standard practice for many companies [8], extensive research has been 
conducted on different aspects of outsourcing different IT/IS activities.
In 1998, Currie and Willcocks studied four types o f IT sourcing arrangements, total 
outsourcing; multiple-supplier sourcing; joint venture/strategic alliance sourcing; and 
insourcing. They specified the relationship between the scale o f IT market used and level 
of client/supplier interdependency, on one hand, and each type of arrangement on the 
other hand and described the risks associated with each resulting situation. They also 
included case studies to show the importance o f contextualization of IT sourcing 
decisions by market, industry sector and managerial/technical skills [34].
In 2000, Plambeck and Taylor studied the effect o f outsourcing manufacturing to contract 
manufacturers on profitability and investment in capacity and innovation. They showed 
that even though contract manufacturing can increase profit through more efficient 
capacity utilization, it may reduce profit by weakening the incentives for innovation.
10
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They concluded that contract manufacturing improves profitability for the industry as a 
whole if  and only if  Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are in a strong 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the Contract Manufacturer (CM). They proposed pooling 
capacity between OEMs through supply contracts or a joint venture as a more desirable 
alternative solution for week OEMS, although this may result in overinvestment in 
innovation and capacity.
In 2005, Rohde studied the outsourcing practices o f very small through to medium-sized 
manufacturing organizations. Her research revealed that while the decision to outsource 
was similar across all firms, the manner in which functions were outsourced differed 
depending on the size o f the firm [23], The results o f many of such research efforts can 
be generalized and extended to outsourcing other functions and services, including 
manufacturing-related services.
A quite comprehensive literature survey on outsourcing was done by Jiang & Qureshi in 
2005 along with suggestions regarding future opportunities in this area. They identified 
three gaps in outsourcing research literature: little attention to outsourcing impacts on 
firms’ performance and value, reliance on managers’ estimates in place o f tangible 
metrics, and focus on cost savings rather than outsourcing decision’s ultimate benefits 
(firms’ value) for company investors [21].
Also in 2005, Kakabadse & Kakabadse surveyed U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe 
companies regarding current and future outsourcing trends in 2005. They concluded that 
the existing trend of effectively managing relationships with key trusted suppliers is the 
main difference between current and future outsourcing trends and that the best-run 
companies o f the future will focus more on establishing meaningfiil contractual
11
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relationships with a number o f key business partners. They identified studying the 
relationship between the outsourcing results and the outsourcing contract as a promising 
research area [20].
In 2006, Barthelemy & Quelin used Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) o f the firm to study outsourcing agreements. They stressed 
the critical nature o f the relationships between outsourcing clients and their vendors, 
especially with regard to support activities and services that have direct connections with 
manufacturing and the ‘core businesses’. They showed how some characteristics o f the 
contract (e.g. penalties, incentives and monitoring) can offset any opportunism risks and 
mitigate hazards.
The concept o f service-based supply of manufacturing services was introduced by Urbani 
et al, in 2002. They proposed manufacturing capacity supply as an extension of 
traditional outsourcing and an enabler for improved responsiveness and effectiveness. 
They highlighted the drivers for this evolution in the manufacturing capacity supply and 
studied the 8 feasible scenarios where the service provider becomes responsible for the 
supply, operation and maintenance o f the manufacturing capacity needed by the 
customer, for the time horizon of the service along with real-life examples [1].
In 2007, Akbarzadeh & Pasek developed an analytical framework for analyzing the 
behaviors o f the actors towards a manufacturing service supply contract. They classified 
the possible contractual relationship cases into 6 categories based on the attributes o f the 
service under contract and power structure. They analyzed the negotiation space and 
equilibrium point in each case and concluded that the more balanced the power of the 
parties and the more standard the service contracted, the better the efficiency o f a service-
12
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based supply approach for the whole industry in long term [14].
2.2 Risk Assessment and Management
Risk assessment, management and analysis o f outsourced activities are quite extensively 
studied in the literature, qualitatively or quantitatively, in many different fields, including 
health care, environmental and safety engineering, and information technology. There is 
also a fair amount o f research conducted on assessing and managing risks involved in 
outsourcing different activities, especially IT related activities. Most o f such studies are 
focused on the risk factors the end users and buyers o f outsourced activities have to take 
into account and perform risk analysis from the buyers’ perspective. However, software 
development and construction projects are exceptions since the software development 
team’s and contractor’s risk factors are also widely studied and modeled in the literature 
([7][9][10][11][14][27][26]).
In the field o f software development, a variety o f approaches have been used to 
investigate Software Development Risk Factors (SDRFs). There are prioritized lists, 
taxonomies, questionnaires and matrices, for assessing software development risks. There 
exist SDRFs lists numbering to the orders o f 150 or more factors [10]. Houston et al 
found twenty-nine o f these factors were cited most often in the literature and were more 
important according to their survey respondents [7].
In the field o f construction, Mustafa & Al-bahar, in 1991, investigated the subject o f risk 
assessment and developed a scheme of classifying the various sources o f risk in 
construction projects. They applied Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP) in assessing the 
riskiness o f a real-life constructing project [26].
13
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In 1998, Miles & Wilson explored risk management in the development o f a power 
subsystem given the need to push the performance envelope. They described sources of 
project risk as complexity and novelty o f the development process and proposed a risk 
space analysis tool for objectively identifying risk factors [17].
In 1999, Mulholland and Christian developed a schedule risk assessment process for 
construction projects involving typical inputs and expected output to base on the past 
experience. They defined five dimensions o f uncertainty in schedule o f construction 
project and considered the variance o f the performance time distribution o f a project as a 
measure schedule risk. The developed computer-based system in this paper provides a 
structured approach for identifying the sources o f risk in a project and determining the 
range o f schedule outcomes based on these risks [33].
In 2000, Sumner described the risk factors associated with enterprise-wide/ERP 
(enterprise resource planning) projects and identified the risk factors in ERP projects 
which are unique to these projects and grouped them into different categories. Also, she 
organized these risk factors within the context o f the stages o f an ERP project and 
assigned individuals responsible for managing risk factors at each phase and provided 
strategies for controlling risk factors [25].
In a key paper published in 2001, Houston et al described an approach for modeling and 
simulating the effect o f risk factors as a means o f supporting risk management activities 
o f assessment, mitigation, intervention and contingency planning. They found the six 
most important SDRFs through qualitative and quantitative surveys and studied their 
effects. They then produced a base model for stochastically simulating the effects o f these 
risk factors [7].
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Bryson and Sullivan, in 2003, explored ERP outsourcing in terms o f the application 
service provider (ASP) approach, in which a third-party vendor hosts, manages and 
maintains various data and ERP applications, and presented a framework to analyze 
incentive schemes and design ERP outsourcing contracts for the mutual gain o f the 
parties. This framework has three phases. The first two, outsourcer business analysis and 
vendor business analysis, include identifying business objectives o f parties, identifying 
risks, their impacts and possible risk resolution actions. The third phase, outsourcing 
alternatives analysis, focuses on development of effective outsourcing contract using 
transaction cost theory and based on the outputs o f the first two phases [6].
In 2006, Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama stressed the importance o f managing the IS/IT 
outsourcing vendors’ performance using incentive contracts and pointed out the fact that 
to develop an outsourcing contract the IS manager must quantify risks and benefits. They 
offer a method and some mathematical models for analyzing risks and constructing 
incentive contracts for IS outsourcing [8].
Also in 2006, Suri & Soni studied the potential impact o f “low morale”- a risk factor, on 
project outcomes, and proposed an approach to simulate Low Morale to analyze its effect 
on certain software development risk management activities. Their simulator randomly 
generates a Schedule Pressure level from empirical distribution and computes average 
morale level and then Efficiency level based on that[ 10].
Table 2 summarizes the key papers and their associated limitations which this thesis 
attempts to complement and contribute to.
15
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Table 2. Key papers summary
No Paper Method Limitations
1
Mustafa & Al-bahar 
(1991)
AHP
• Deterministic model
• Too specific (to a certain construction 
project)
2
Miles & Wilson 
(1998)
Risk space 
analysis
• Too specific (to certain power plant 
project)
• Focuses only on novelty and 
complexity as sources o f risk
• Does not precisely define customer/ 
stakeholder satisfaction considered as 
outcomes
3
Mulholland & 
Christian (1999)
PERT, 
information 
technology of 
HyperCard 
and Excel
• Focuses only on construction projects
• Only considers schedule risks
4 Houston et al (2001)
Stochastic
simulation,
surveys
• Focuses only on software 
development projects
• Does not consider project and 
arrangement properties
• Is only concerned about project time 
and budget (not holistic and far­
sighted)
5 Suri & Soni (2006)
Stochastic
simulation
• Only considers and models “Low 
morale” and its effect on efficiency 
level
• Focuses only on software 
development projects
16
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• Does not consider project and 
arrangement properties
6
Akbarzadeh & Pasek 
(2007)
Mathematical 
analysis o f 
negotiation 
space and 
equilibrium 
point
• Only considers the bottom-line
• Does not specifically focus on the 
risks
As shown in the table, there is a gap in the risk assessment literature with regard to 
considering risks threatening an enterprises image and contractual relationship with its 
clients. In other words, almost all similar papers in the literature do not have a holistic 
approach and only focus on risks jeopardizing the project time and budget. Moreover, 
almost all the papers listed in the table, except number 6 and to some extent number 2, 
are either too general or too specific to a certain project.
This thesis attempts to address these limitations and gaps in the current literature and 
provide a framework which takes into account the context o f performing risk assessment 
with a far-sighted holistic point o f view.
17
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C HAPTER3 Design and 
methodology
3.1 Scenarios Studied
Considering the balance o f power and the attributes o f the manufacturing service under 
contract, six possible extreme scenarios can be considered [14]. Figure 1 shows the 
sources o f different types of power [13] whose weighted sum determines parties’ relative 
power. The negative signs indicate an adverse relationship.
Coercive Power
Reputation
^  Reward Power
Size [4'
Competition ( uniqueness)[2]
Referent Power
Economic position
ixpertise Power
market power [11]
'Persuasion Power<; ’lant ownership [13]
^Legitimate Power^General Expertise/ 
Experience
^^Information Power
Relative power
Figure 1. Different types o f power and their sources
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The relative balance o f power is influenced by the following factors:
• Previous relationship [2]
• Trust
• Loyalty
• Continuation probability[3]
• Parties culture
• Organizational Culture
• Industry
• Geographic region
• Regulated environment
On the other hand, the service under contract can be a commodity service or a specific 
and unique service. Factors defining specificity are illustrated in Figure 2.
Asset-specificity 
 m i .  r i 3 i ____
Complexity/size
 HZJ_____
Time-sensitivity (-) Life cycle 
 position__
Specificity
Figure 2. Definition o f specificity
The six possible combinations o f these two factors, i.e. service attributes and the balance 
o f power, can be considered as six scenarios as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Advantage
Balance of Power
Figure 3. Different possible scenarios
Mathematical analysis performed in [14] shows the amount o f hypothetical risk involved 
in each scenario. According to that, the riskiest scenarios are Scenario C, Scenario A, and 
Scenario F. The least risky scenarios, on the other hand, are Scenario E, Scenario B, and 
Scenario D (Figure 4). Thus, we focus on the riskiest scenarios and apply the given 
framework to them to assess the probability o f failure for each, and then compare the 
results.
20
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Hypothetical risk
Figure 4. Hypothecial riskiness o f scenarios
3.2 Cost Breakdown Structure
To calculate the costs the MSP incurs we basically use the cost structure described in 
[14]. The MSP rents its service to the EU for a defined period o f time, t , and a leasing 
price, L. MSP’s net present value (NPV) can be formulated as [14]:
NPVt
X ( L - C mP\ e » d t if  C msp < L
MSP = < (1)
_J |(L -  CMSP )| • (e pt -  2)dt Otherwise
where C m s p  is MSP’s total costs of delivering the service, p  is the opportunity cost of
\ — e~p
money for the MSP, B = --------- , and t is the time horizon of the contract. To
Normalize, we consider of the MSP’s cost items as their percentage o f L, and let L=100,
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and t= 1. Thus, we will have the percentage o f net present value as:
r
5(100- C W ) if  C m sp  < 100
n p v m s p J (2)
1(5 -  2 ) ( C ' m sp  - 100) Otherwise
where, C m s p
Using this formula the losses will be magnified in the same way the profits are reduced as 
a result o f lost opportunities and considering opportunity costs.
Considering the implications o f Transactions Costs Economy (TCE), C m s p  can be broken 
down as follows:
• Production costs (Cprod)
>  Investment (machinery, human resources, processes, peripheral)
>  Operational costs
• Transaction costs (CT)
>  Ex ante (deterministic/fixed)
Bidding, negotiation, legal, and contracting costs, and other charges that might be 
incurred to set up the relationship [8],
>  Ex post (stochastic)
Reporting, communication, transition [8], renegotiation, conflict resolution, 
penalties, law suits, publicity, marketing, and adaptation costs.
o Adjustment costs (in response to changes in volume or product
specifications) [24]
22
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• Opportunity costs (p) [14]
We assume that the ex ante transaction costs, Cex_ante, have been already incurred and are 
inputs to our model, and that opportunity costs, p,  are also given and remain constant 
during the contract’s time horizon. These three main categories o f costs are going to be 
considered in the model and the costs resulting from the actualization o f risk factors are 
added to appropriate cost categories in a linear manner.
first need to define success or failure. Here, failure is defined as the occurrence o f one or 
more than o f the following fatal risk factors, defined in terms o f binary variables:
• Financial loss (FLo)
3.3 Probability of Failure
The objective o f the model is to study the probability o f failure o f the contract. Thus, we
(3)
Otherwise
•  Incomplete contract (7Q 
'  1 if  Pb
\C=<
ic>PIC
(4)
Otherwise
• Loss o f partner (LoP)
f l if  P lo p > P LoP
LoP=] (5)
0 Otherwise
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• Loss of image/reputation (Lol)
'1 if  P l o i >  P LoI
LoI=“ (6)
.0 Otherwise
Failure o f the contract can be defined as the weighted sum of the above random variables:
PFailure=  FLO* WFLo + IC* WIC + LoP* WloP + Lol* WloI (7)
where, WFLo+ WIC+ WLoP + WLoi= 1, and, therefore, 0< P F au u r e < L
Note that considering the linear cost accumulation formula and the definition o f Financial 
Loss and Failure, convert the continuous total costs, and therefore NPV, to discrete step­
wise probabilities o f financial loss and failure. In other words, first, costs are accumulated 
and the NPV is calculated using equation (2). Then, if  the obtained NPV is less than a 
pre-defined threshold, FLo will be equal to 1, which will, in turn, lead to an increase in
PFailure b y  W FLo-
3.4 General Methodology and Model Description
The generic risk assessment process utilized in [7] is going to be used as a roadmap. This 
process is composed o f the following stages:
1. Identifying the risk factors. This stage involves analyzing the power structure 
and the attributes o f  the service under contract to identify the m ost im portant risk 
factors which can potentially lead to the failure o f the contract.
2. Modeling the system to incorporate the risk factors. In this stage, the inter-
24
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relationships between the risk factors are described and modeled.
3. Quantifying risk factor uncertainties. Here, random variables are defined to 
quantify the uncertainties associated with each risk factor. Afterwards, the a 
distribution function is assigned to each defined random variables using various 
methods, such as, for example, fitting distributions to historical data or using the 
opinions o f experts.
4. Propagating the uncertainties. At this stage the model is exercised to output the 
probability o f failure.
5. Sensitivity analysis. Having the probability o f failure resulting from previous 
stages, the model can be used to find alternatives which help decreasing the 
probability o f failure.
Each step is going to be completely customized to incorporate the unique requirements 
and characteristics o f the manufacturing related services.
3.5 Proposed Methodology
To model the contractual relationship of the MSP and the EU, who is leasing the 
manufacturing services for a defined time horizon, a hierarchy of risk factors is 
developed using a mixture o f bottom-up and top-down methods. Figure 5 illustrates the 
way risk factors are organized in a three-level hierarchy. The hierarchy illustrated in this 
figure is the output o f the risk identification process and is used as the input o f risk 
quantification and modeling process.
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Define contract’s success/failure
More
critical
Qualify
Qualify
Level-3 Risk Factors
Level-2 Risk Factors
Level-1 Risk Factors
Root
causes
Service Attributes Power Structure
Figure 5. Risk Factors Structure
Such hierarchy, in which each level qualifies the next level, if  it passes a defined
threshold, makes devising risk mitigation, and management plans easier and more
efficient since it considers the root cause of each risk factor. Moreover, each Level-2 and 
Level-3 risk factor can be traced back to one or more Level-1 risk factor. Thus, if  the root 
cause Level-1 risk factors o f each higher level risk factor are controllable, the higher 
level risk factor can be also managed and controlled through managing and controlling its 
root cause.
The generic process described in  the previous chapter is custom ized as follows.
3.5.1 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the system
As mentioned before, in this stage the three-level hierarchy o f risk factors is constructed
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using a mixed method, i.e. a combination o f top-down and bottom-up methods. This 
means that, first, starting from the top, Level-3 risk factors are identified, then, from the 
bottom, the first level o f the structure is built, and, finally, by connecting these two levels, 
the second level o f the structure is constructed.
The steps followed in this stage are as follows:
Step 1_ Identifying and Modeling Level-3 risk factors
1. Considering the objective function and the definition of failure, provided in the 
previous chapter, list Level-3 risk factors. From our definition these fatal risk 
factors are as follows:
• Financial loss
• Loss o f image/reputation
• Loss o f partner
• Incomplete contract
2. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.
Step 2_ Identifying and Modeling Level-1 risk factors
1. List the attributes o f the service under contract and the direction o f the power.
2. Consider the attributes listed in sub-step 1, brainstorm their possible implications 
and effects, and list the most important relevant risk factors, in terms o f both the 
probability o f occurrence and the severity o f the potential outcomes, resulting 
from each attribute. These risk factors form the fist level o f risk factors o f the 
model.
3. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.
4. List the impacts o f each Level-1 risk factor.
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Step 3_ Identifying and Modeling Level-2 risk factors
1. Consider Level-1 and Level-3 risk factors and find out how the Level-3 risk 
factors can be resulting from the Level-1 ones, considering the impacts o f Level-1 
risk factors found in step 2. List the most important risk factors resulting from the 
actualization o f Level-1 risk factors which can potentially lead to Level-3 risk 
factors, considering their potential impacts. These risk factors form the Level-2 
risk factors o f the model.
2. Find the cause-and-effect relationships between the identified risk factors.
Figure 6 illustrates the process o f identifying the risk factors and modeling the system. To 
identify the risk factors, their impacts, and their interrelationships, risk factor lists 
mentioned in the literature (for example in ([7][8][9][10][11][15][14])), brainstorming 
sessions, Delphi method, or experts’ opinions can be used as guidelines, depending on 
their availability.
Form T,eve1-3 Risk Factors
Connect Level-1 and Level-3 Risk 
Factors by defining Level-2 Risk
Identify Level-1 Risk Factors using 
service attributes and power structure
Figure 6. Identifying and Modeling Risk Factors Process
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3.5.2 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
1. Start from the Level-1 risk factors and move in a bottom-up manner to higher 
levels. Define quantified measures for each risk factor in terms o f random 
variables using their impacts, similar to what is done for the fatal risk factors in 
defining the objective function. Note that one risk factor can be translated into 
more than one random variable.
2. Consider the cause-and-effects relationships between the risk factors and translate 
these relationships into qualification relationships between the random variables 
defined in the previous sub-step. Also, consider that co-movements of variables in 
the same direction and in the opposite direction i.e. situations when a high value 
o f one variable means a high or low value for another variable, and quantify these 
co-movements by setting up a correlation matrix.
3. Assign a probability distribution function to each random variable associated with 
each risk factor, along with the correlations between each two correlated random 
variable.
4. For each qualification relationship, define a threshold, whose violation activates 
the dependent risk factor(s), using either brainstorming or available data.
To quantify the risk factors, various methods including analysis o f historical data, 
brainstorming, surveys, and questioners can be used. Also, some risk factors already 
modeled in the literature (especially in [7] and [11]) can be reused.
To model correlated variables, since different variable follow different distributions, the 
so called “distribution-free” approach or Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients
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should be used (For more information on this approach refer to Appendix A).
Before describing the simulation method used in this thesis, a brief overview o f Monte 
Carlo simulation approach is presented.
3.5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
In general, “Monte Carlo methods” are used to solve problems which are too complex to 
solve analytically (e.g. do not have closed-form solutions) through generating suitable 
random numbers and observing that fraction of the numbers obeying some property or 
properties [22]. Monte Carlo simulation is a widely used tool in many fields, including 
classical risk management models utilized to simulate the behavior o f the system 
considering uncertainties o f risk factors.
Monte Carlo simulation is a method for iteratively evaluating a model using sets o f 
random numbers as inputs. It is useful for analyzing uncertainty propagation, where the 
goal is to determine how random variation, lack o f knowledge, or errors affect the 
modeled system. Monte Carlo simulation is a sampling method because the inputs are 
randomly generated from probability distributions to simulate the sampling from an 
actual population. Figure 7 shows a schematic view of Monte Carlo simulation [31], note 
thaty(v) is a function o f vector x=(x/, x?, x.?).
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Figure 7. The Base o f Monte Carlo Simulation [31]
Monte Carlo Simulation is useful method for risk assessment and management because it 
helps studying the behavior of the system given the uncertainties of risk factors. It allows 
for studying the outcomes (success or failure) of the system in the event o f various 
possible values o f random variables associated with risk factors. Thus, a Monte Carlo 
Simulation method is proposed to propagate the uncertainties o f risk factors identified, 
modeled and quantified in the previous steps o f the proposed methodology.
3.5.4 Propagating Uncertainties Using a Multi-stage Monte Carlo Method
Using the proposed multi-stage Monte Carlo simulation technique, stochastically 
simulate the model using the random variables o f the first level of risk factors as the 
inputs, and the Level-3 risk factors, and the failure probability, as the outputs o f the 
simulations model. Figure 8 summarizes the simulation process.
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Level-1 risk 
factors Vr  ---
Monte Carlo Simulator
Level-1 risk factors
■ t
Accumulated
Qualified Level-2 risk factors \  /
Monte Carlo Simulator
Level-2 risk factors samples 1 Accumulated
Qualified Level-3 risk factors \ /
Monte Carlo Simulator
X X
Probability of Failure 
Figure 8. Proposed Monte Carlo simulation Method
To specify the required number of simulations the jack-knife technique can be used. Jack- 
knife technique works as follows: start with an arbitrary number o f simulations, N, and 
run the simulation twice to get two answers. Compare the answers; and if  the difference 
between the two results is more than a predefined limit, e, double the simulations to 2*N. 
Keep doubling the number of simulations until the error is smaller than e [15].
It should be pointed out that using Monte Carlo Simulation implies that the proposed 
framework model falls in the category o f classical risk management models.
To im plem ent the sim ulation m odel, w e utilize @ Risk, w hich is a M icrosoft Excel add­
on used for performing risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation [29].
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3.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The objective o f this stage is to identify the most significant root causes o f failure, 
evaluate their impacts, and check if  they can be controlled, and if  yes, assess the impact 
o f controlling them on the probability o f failure. This means that in this stage, the main 
attempt is to find the Level-1 risk factors which contribute the most to failure o f the 
contractual relationship.
To do this we perform regression sensitivity analysis using tornado graphs and analyze 
the results. To perform regression sensitivity analysis, a multiple linear regression1, based 
on the results o f simulation runs, is done using the selected outputs (e.g. Probability of 
failure) as the dependent variable and the values o f random variables, defined to quantify 
risk factors, as the independent variables. The standardized regression coefficients (or 
beta) of independent variables are, then, graphed in decreasing order in a tornado 
diagram.
The beta coefficient o f an independent variable shows the number of standard deviations 
by which the independent variable increases by one standard deviation, having fixed all 
other independent variables. The bigger the absolute value of a beta coefficient, the most 
influential the associated random variable.
1 Regression is a term for fitting data to a theoretical equation. In the case of linear regression, the 
input data is fit to a line. Multiple regression tries to fit multiple input data sets to a planar equation 
that could produce the output data set. [29]. In other words, The objective of multiple linear 
regression analysis is to find the best b coefficients to be model the relationship between an 
independent variable, Y, and n independent variables, xh i=0,..,n, as follows:
Y= bo+biXi+b2X2+...+bnxn+e
where bo is the intercept ("constant" term), Z>,s are the respective parameters of independent 
variables, and e is the involved error.
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The R-squared value can be used as a measurement of the percentage o f variation 
explained by the linear relationship. If R-squared is less than ~ 60%, the relationship 
between the inputs and outputs can not assume to be linear.
Hence, using the generated tornado graph, it is possible to visually identify the most 
significant random variable in terms of their impact on the selected output. Since each 
random variable is associated with a certain risk factor, this means that the most 
influential risk factors can be also identified. Furthermore, from previous stages, it is
known which Level-1 risk factor(s) are the root cause(s) o f each Level-2 and 3 risk
factors. Thus, tornado graphs resulting from regression sensitivity analysis can be used to 
help identifying the main root causes o f failure (as the main output o f the simulation 
model) and evaluating their severity.
In summary, this stage can be summarized as follows:
1. Find out the most influential random variables using regression sensitivity
analysis.
2. Trace back these most influential variables to their root cause Level-1 risk factors.
3. Check if  each o f the identified most influential Level-1 risk factors are 
controllable.
4. Examine the effect o f controlling controllable Level-1 risk factors.
As mentioned before, due to the structure o f the risk factors, where each risk factor can 
be tracked back to a Level-1 risk factor, uncontrollable higher level risk factors rooted in 
controllable lower level ones can be managed and mitigated through controlling the root 
cause Level-1 risk factor(s).
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Here, we model the three riskiest possible scenarios, analyze and compare the results. 
Such comprehensive sensitivity analysis can be very useful in defining risk mitigation 
and intervention plans for companies; once they realize in which category their 
contractual buyer-supplier relationship falls.
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cHAPTER4 Applying the Proposed Methodology to Scenarios
4.1 Scenario C
4.1.1 Description
As mentioned before, Scenario C is the riskiest scenario as it involves supplying a 
specific service for an EU which is in superior position power wise. Start-up companies 
providing innovative services will most likely fall into this category.
In scenario C, according to the definition o f specificity, the service under contract is a 
complex, novel service which involves a high degree o f asset specificity, for both 
physical and human resources related assets. Also, as a result o f the market conditions or 
the nature o f the service, it has to be delivered to the EU, and to the market, in a short 
time, or otherwise its value will depreciate significantly over time.
Note that as in this scenario the balance o f power is in favor o f the EU, all managerial 
categories o f uncertainties, i.e. uncertainty in time, in information, and in control[7], have 
to be considered. This means that the risk factors associated with this scenario have 
higher likelihood and severity and are less controllable.
In 2003, when Flextronics was trying to market its Phone 4 phones to major cell phone
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market players, who would brand, market and distribute the product, its situation can fall 
under this scenario. Flextronics, who has long worked as only a contract manufacturer of 
cellphones designed by OEMs, was now offering a new and rather complex product, 
especially in terms o f intellectual property rights, to the same OEMs who had a well- 
established position in the market and were therefore in a better bargaining position. This 
marketing effort proved to be risky in reality as the customers (OEMs) were trying to 
impose difficult terms and conditions on Flextronics and the company had to spend a 
very long time finding interested customers and negotiating contracts [31].
4.1.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the System
This section describes how the risk factors associated with this scenario are identified, 
and are modeled using the methodology described in Chapter 3.
Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.
Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
The risk factors directly resulting from the attributes of the contracted manufacturing 
service, which form the main part o f the first level of our hierarchy, are represented in 
Figure 9 (The risk factors are put in boxes). The influence diagram in Figure 9 represents 
the cause-and-effect relationships between these risk factors2.
2 Regarding notation arrows indicate cause-and-effect relationships and a -  sign indicates adverse 
relationship, i.e. the effect decreases as the cause increases and vice versa. Also, a “leads to” 
relationship means that the cause risk factor can potentially result in the effect risk factor.
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Moreover, as the balance of power is in favor of the EU, it will probably behave 
opportunistically to maximize its own profit. Thus, “EU’s Opportunistic Behavior” is the 
most important risk factor resulting form EU’s superior power.
Level-1 risk factors
Service attributes
High novelty
High time-sensitivity
High asset specificity
Technical problems
High production costs
Lack of qualified personnel
Excessive schedule pressure
Large size/high complexity
Leads to ----- ►
Level-1 risk factor
Figure 9. Level-1 risk factors rooted in nature of contracted service in Scenario C
The identified Level-1 risk factors are inter-related and their relationships are shown in 
Figure 10. These relationships indicate that the random variables defined to model these 
risk factors will be correlated.
^ Technical problems are in fact a group of risk factors which can be considered as a whole, these risk 
factors include:
• Inadequate technology
• Little or no task programmability ( knowledge of the process) [11]
• Technical/configuration errors
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Technical problemsHigh production costs
Excessive schedule pressureLack of qualified personnel
Leads to ------►
Level-1 rsik factor
Figure 10. Interrelationships between Level-1 risk factors resulting from the nature o f the
contracted service
Figure 11 illustrates the risk factors resulting from EU’s superior power.
Level-1 risk factors
Leads to
Power Structure Level-1 rsik factorEU’s superior power
Low productivity
Financial pressureCreeping requirements
Excessive schedule pressure
EU’s opportunistic behavior
Figure 11. Level-1 o f risk factors resulting from EU’s superior power in Scenario C
The impacts o f Level-1 risk factors are listed in Table 3. Studying the potential impacts 
o f Level-1 risk factors helps with identifying Level-2 risk factors.
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Table 3. Impacts o f Level-1 risk factors
Risk Factor Effects
Lack of qualified personnel [7]
• Lost time to find and hire qualified personnel
• Training, hiring, and adapting costs
• Continuing with under qualified personnel
Technical problems
• Technical/configuration errors
• Defects
• Cost o f defects/errors
• Time to fix defects/errors
Excessive schedule pressure[7]
• Excessive effort to meet deadlines which 
may lead to low moral and attritional 
losses[7]
• Costs o f overtime, incentives, etc
Low Productivity[7]
More time and effort, inferior results (in terms 
of meeting requirements4)
Low commitment Low productivity
EU ’ s opportunistic behavior
Time and cost pressure, creeping requirements 
[71, overdependence on the EU
Lack of qualified personnel [7] and lack o f experience is a result o f the fact that the 
service is new and in the early stages o f its life cycle. This causes costs o f hiring, training 
and adapting employees, and triggers the risk o f loosing time before the human resources
obtain the required degree of expertise. Lack o f sufficient experience and expertise also
■r
bears technical risks and the time lost in searching for qualified people and training may 
lead to excessive schedule pressure and delays.
Technical problem s can lead to technical/configuration errors and defects in  the product.
4 The term requirement is used in its broad sense and includes all functional, non-functional, 
quality, time and budget requirements of the EU, as specified in the contract
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These errors or defects take some time to be fixed and can lead to excessive schedule 
pressure. They can also cause costs o f rework and/or wastes.
Excessive schedule pressure is also an important risk factor, especially because of the 
time-sensitive nature of the manufacturing service contracted. Excessive schedule 
pressure incorporates tight deadlines, and forces the personnel to put more effort than 
average to meet the deadlines. This can result in exhaustion and low morale[7] and, 
therefore, low productivity of the personnel. Moreover, excessive schedule pressure can 
increase the likelihood of making errors and technical problems.
High production costs actually means that as a result of inaccurate cost estimation, 
significant unexpected additional costs, or any other reason, the production costs are 
much higher over initial estimates at the time of bidding and negotiating the contract.
On the other hand, as the EU is in a better position than the MSP and has more relative 
power, it may pressure the EU for doing more in less time and for substantially lower 
prices. In fact, the agreed price imposed by the contract may be far too low and the time­
line may be unrealistically short in the first place, and the EU might be able to exert even 
more pressure the MSP.
Step 3_ Level-2 risk factors
The first level of risk factors, if  actualized, give rise to the second level o f risk factors, 
which are more fatal and can directly cause the MSP to fail. For simplicity, this step is 
illustrated using three figures (Level-2 risk factors are in bold boxes). Figure 12 
illustrates Level-2 risk factors resulting from the actualization of risk factors associated
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with the service under contract.
jM issm^^quiremen^
Level-2 risk factors
Level-lrisk factors
Law suits
Cost overrun
Excessive schedule pressure Technical risk factors
High production costs
Lack of qualified personnel
leads to
Level-1 risk factor | |
Level-2 risk factor □
Figure 12. Level-2 risk factors rooted in service attributes in Scenario C
Figure 13 shows Level-2 risk factors resulting from the fact that the balance o f power is 
in favor o f the EU, and, therefore, it may behave opportunistically.
Controversial relationship
Missing requirements I Cost overrun
Lawsuits
Level-2 risk factors
Level-lrisk factors
leads to
Low productivity
Financial pressureCreeping requirements
Excessive schedule pressure
Level-1 risk factor | |
Level-2 risk factor □
Figure 13. Level-2 risk factors rooted in power structure in Scenario C
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Figure 14 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how 
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail with respect to its contractual 
relationship with the EU. (Rounded bold boxes indicate Level-3 risk factors and some of 
the repetitive relationships are omitted).
floss of image/reputation.
incomplete contract
loss of partner
Level-3 risk factors
Level-2 risk factors
Law suits
Missing requirementsCost overrun
COTitov^yjrdatiM^dpJ
leads to ---- ►
Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor 
Figure 14. Level-2 and Level-3 Risk factors in Scenario C
Table 4 summarizes the negative effects of Level-2 risk factor which can potentially lead 
to Level-3 risk factors.
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Table 4. The impacts o f Level-2 risk factors in Scenario C
Risk Factor Effects
Missing requirements
• A percentage o f agreed requirements will not be met
• Renegotiation costs, penalties
Cost overrun No/little margins gained in the job
Controversial
relationship
• Large number of sever conflicts
• Conflict resolution costs
Law suits
• Bad publicity
• Publicity, court costs and penalties
4.1.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Model General Notations
• Initial values or thresholds are specified with hats, for example CPR indicates the lower 
bound of the Cpr, costs o f doing PR.
• P  indicates the probability o f its subscript, for example PFaiiure indicates the probability 
of the failure (of the contract).
•  All total costs are indicated with letter C and their nature is indicated in the subscript. 
For example, CPR indicates costs of PR (public relations). Note that all costs are in 
terms of percentage of total costs.
• All times are indicated with letter T and their nature is indicated in the subscript. For
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example, Ttech indicates time wasted for fixing technical problems/errors5.
• All random distribution functions are represented by f
•  D  indicates degree, for example Dcontroversy indicates degree of controversy in the 
relationship.
Also, whenever a 1 to 7 scale is used, the numbers indicate qualitative values as follows:
1 Very Low
2 Low
3 Fairly low
4 Average
5 Fairly high
6 High
7 Very high
A 1 to 4 scale, whenever used, covers the last four o f the above degrees, as follows:
1 Average
2 Fairly high
3 High
4 Very high
Level-1 risk factors
In this section, we explain the way Level-1 risk factors are quantified. Considering the 
impacts and implications of each risk factor a number o f random variables are defined to
5 We have considered a normal distribution for the T variables which is consistent with the project 
management and scheduling practices and literature (e.g. [33]).
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quantify each risk factor. Also, an example distribution is considered for each random 
variable to be used in the example simulation run.
• Lack o f qualified personnel[7]
• Total percentage o f lost time ( TperSonnei ~ 1 to 7 scale)
• Total percentage o f additional costs o f personnel hiring, training,...(C p erSonnei ~
f t  CPersonnel) f
• Continuation with under qualified personnel ( Punderquaiified)
fT if  'Tpersonnei> 4  OR CpersonneP* CPersonnel
Punderqualified ' = 1 (8)
f^underqaalified Otherwise
Tpersonnei and C personnei are strongly correlated. In the simulated example, we consider the 
following distributions:
• Tpersonnei ~ Binomial (3, 0.5, shift (+1))
• CPersonnel ~ N(5, 2)
** 7• C personnef=5 , Punlierqualified
• Technical problems
• Total % cost o f error s/defects ( C tech ~ f  (  C tech))
• Total % time to fix errors/defects ( T tech ~ f  (  T tech))
These two random variables are strongly correlated and have positive correlation with 
continuation with under qualified personnel and negative correlation with productivity
6 This is in addition to ordinary labour costs which are considered as part of the production costs
^ TPersonnel ~~ M {CPersonnel)^" ® (CPersonnel)
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level. In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions:
•  C tech  ~ N (8, 5)
• Ttech ~ Binomial (6, 0.5, shift (+1))
• Excessive schedule pressure [7]
• Degree o f schedule pressure ( D scheduie) ~1 to 7 scale (where higher degrees have 
higher probabilities)
• Total % cost to make up schedule pressure ( C scheduie ~  / (  C scheduie) )
These two random variables are positively correlated; D scheduie is also positively correlated 
with T tech and Tpers0nnei• In the example we consider:
•  p {D sch ed u ie=  {1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=( {0.05,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.23,0.22,0.2})
• C Schedule ~ N(5, 2.5)
• Low Productivity[7]
• Degree o f productivity (Dproductivity)- 1 to 7 scale
Dproductivity has strong negative correlation with degree o f schedule pressure, percentage of 
added requirements and is negatively correlated with D p i / o p p o r t u n i s m • In the example we
consider that D p roductiv ity  follows a binomial (6, 0.5) distribution, shifted one unit to the 
right. Figure 15 represents the Binomial (6, 0.5, shift (+1)) distribution’s graph. It is clear 
from the graph that the closer the degree to average, the more the probability. In fact, the 
graph can be approximated by a normal distribution which is traditionally considered to 
model natural phenomena.
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Binom ial(6,0.5) Shift=+1
0.35V
0.25--
a-io--
0.00
2.000 6.000
Figure 15. Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(+l)) distribution
• EU’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree of EU’s opportunism (D Euopportumsm)~ 1 to 7 scale
Note that as EU has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism 
are considered to be greater. Dsckeduie is positively correlated with Dopportunism since the EU 
can pressure the MSP to complete what is committed to do in shorter time.
In the example, P( p Euopportmism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = ({0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.22,0.2,0.18})
• Creeping requirements
• Costs o f extra requirements (CxRq~ f  (CxRq)) (is added to production costs)
CXRq is strongly correlated w ith M R q, and D EUopportunism.
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In the numerical example, /  (CXRq)  is assumed to follow Exponential (20) distribution 
[7]8.
• Financial pressure
• The imposed price cut on the MSP (L~), defined as a percentage of original L, 
leasing price stated in the original contract, which follows a f(L )  distribution.
f(L )  is considered to be N(10, 5) in the example.
Table 5 summarizes how the effects o f Level-1 risk factors and the relationships between 
Level-land Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated.
8 Houston et al found out that the percentage of additional work to do as a result of requirements 
creep follows an exponential distribution [7]. Assuming a linear relationship between these 
additional work and their associated costs, we can assume an exponential distribution for costs of 
extra requirements as well.
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Table 5. Relationships between Level-1 and Level-2 risk factors
Level-1 risk factor Level-2 risk factor formulation
Lack of qualified personnel[7]
•  C p ersonnei is added to production costs (HR 
investment)
• Qualifies MRq if  Pu n derqualified~l
Technical problems
• C tech  is added to production costs
• Qualifies MRq if  C tech>  C tech OR T tech >  4. 
(In the example C tech = 20 9).
Excessive schedule pressure
• C scheduie is added to production costs (HR 
investment)
• Qualifies MRq if  D scheduie >  4
Low productivity Qualifies PIRq if  Dproductivity 4
EU’s opportunistic behavior Qualifies XRq, MRq, D controversy and L if
R^EVovvortunisrK>  4
Level-2 risk factors
In this section we describe the way Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated.
• Missing requirements
• % o f requirements missed {MRq ~ /  (MRq))
• Costs o f missing requirements {CMRq ~ /  (CMRq )) (added to ex post transaction 
costs)
These two random variables are strongly correlated with each other, Dopportmism, DSCf,eduie 
and XRq.
• Cost overrun
Already defined.
^  C eCH M (C{ech) O (Ctech)
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•  Controversial relationship
• Degree o f controversy (Dcontroversy)~ 1 to 4 scale
• Cost o f conflicts (added to ex post transaction costs)
f  (Cconflict) i f  D controversy^*®
C conflic t-  ( 9 )
v 0 Otherwise
These 2 random variables are strongly correlated and positively correlated with
D'EUopportunism
• Law suits
• Additional court costs (Ciawsuits) (added to ex post transaction costs)
Clawsuits
~  f (Ciawsuits) if  Dcontroversy 4 Or MRq >  MRq\
(10)
0 Otherwise
Clawsuit is strongly correlated with MRq.
In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions:
• M Rq- N(30, 20)
• Cmrct N(15, 8)
•  D controversy~ binomial(3,0.5), shifted one unit to right
• Ciawsuits ~ N(70, 20 )
The second level o f risk factors can directly lead to failure of the contract. The stochastic 
relationships between the second level risk factors and the fatal risk factors, whose 
occurrence mean the failure o f the contract, are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6 . Qualification Relationships of Level-2 risk factors
Level-2 risk factor Qualification Relationships
Missing requirements
IF MRq >MRq2 11 THEN qualifies
• Controversial relationship (Dcontroversy)
• Incomplete contract ( P^Rq = 1)
• Loss of partner ( Pp0Rq = 1)
• Loss of image ( P^ fq = 1)
Cost overrun Already defined
Controversial relationship
IF Dcontroversy >=3 THEN qualifies
• Incomplete contract ( p ^ niroversy = [)
• Loss o f partner( P ^ roversy=1)
• Loss o f image (P ^“ ^ = l)
Law suits
IF occur at all {Ciawsuits >0) THEN qualifies:
• Incomplete contract ( pj£wSuUs = 1)
• Loss o f image ( P “ 'te =1)
• Loss o f partner ( = 1 )
The weighted sum of the probability of each Level-3 risk factor caused by each Level-2 
one defines the probability of its occurrence, as follows:
r> , LawSuits & ryLawSuits _±_ ,, controversy * ry controversy _i_ „.M R q  sk ryMRq / I  1 \lic= w ,c * Prc + wIC *FIC + wIC * PIC (11)
  LawSuits * jy  LawSuits , Controversy & ryControversy , „, M Rq * jyMRq /■*lop -  w,op *pLoP +w LoP * r !oP + w,oP * f!oP (12)
■p   LawSuits % -pLawSuits . Controversy ^ pControversy , M Rq % p M R q  / i
* L o r ~  W Lo} r Lo} 1" W loI  Lo l Lol Lol V1
10 All P  variables in this table are equal to 0 if not qualified.
11 MRq\>MRq2
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Even though “Incomplete contract” leads to “Loss o f partner” and “Loss o f image” as the 
root causes o f all these Level-3 risk factors are the same Level-2 risk factors, their 
interrelationship is already modeled. In other words, occurrence o f “Incomplete contract” 
means that a law suit has happened, and/or the percentage o f missing requirements or the 
degree o f controversy is greater than a limit which is also the precondition for “Loss o f 
partner” or “Loss o f Image”. Thus, if  the contract is incomplete, the probability o f losing 
the partner or the company’s reputation is automatically higher.
In the simulated example, we consider the following values for the model:
£=$0; PK. -  PLoF=PLoI =0.5; MRql=70; MRq2=3012; w“ te= 0.5; w“ ""'overs>’ =0.3;
0.2; w ^ meny= 0.1; < £?=0.5 ; =0.4; w“ s =0.4; wcL°0f roversy =0.1;
< ? = 0 .5 .
4.1.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
Figure 16 shows the schematic presentation of the simulation model.
12 MRq\ = n (MRq)+ 2o (MRq), M Rql = (i (MRq)
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Figure 16. Schematic view o f the simulation model
Figure 17 shows the cost breakdown structure of each cost category, without considering 
opportunity costs. All the cost items under Total Cprod and Total C ex.ante are in addition to
the original C pnxi and C ex.ante■ Total costs ( C m sp  ) are subtracted from (100-L~) and are 
applied to equation (2) to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) o f delivering the 
manufacturing service for the MSP.
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Figure 17. Cost breakdown structure
Considering WFLo=0.15; if/c=0.25; WIjOp=0A\ WLor0 .2 , p=$0.5 [11], e =0.005, and that 
production costs (Cprod) follows N (50, 20) distribution, the following results were 
obtained after running 40,000 simulations.
Note that as in Scenario C the MSP is offering a novel complex service to a more 
powerful and reputable EU, the weight o f Financial Loss is considered less than the 
weight of Loss o f Partner and Loss o f Image. This is consistent with what is seen in real 
world when start-up companies even accept some monetary loss to build relationship 
with promising customers and to establish a good reputation in the market.
Table 7 represents the results o f simulating the developed model for Scenario C, plugging 
in sample distributions.
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Table 7. Simulation results for Scenario C numerical example
N am e M in im u m M ean M a x im u m  x1 p1 I x 2  | p2
O u tp u ts
Total C prod 8.199 72.526 190.088 37.251 5% 119.634 95%
Total C ex-post 0.033 35.894 190.173 10.569 5% 117.394 95%
C MSP 14.599 120.072 371.825 63.435 5% 225.161 95%
% NPV -329.741 -27.660 67.206 -151.874 5% 28.768 95%
FLo 0 0.599 1 0 5% 1 95%
LoP 0 0.323 1 0 5% 1 95%
1C 0 0.132 1 0 5% 1 95%
Lol 0 0.323 1 0 5% 1 95%
F a ilu re
P ro b a b ility
0 0.317 1 0 5% 1 95%
In p u ts
C prod 0.058 40.057 106.042 15.592 5% 64.784 95%
C ex-post 0.002 10.040 26.148 3.685 5% 16.571 95%
"^Personnel 1 5 7 2 5% 7 95%
Cpersonnei 0 5.049 13.282 1.808 5% 8.315 95%
p
1 underqualified 0 0.036 1 0 5% 0 95%
Ctech 0 8.597 32.717 1.651 5% 16.350 95%
Ttech 1 5 7 1 5 % 7 95%
^schedule 1 5 7 1 5% 7 95%
Cscheduie 0 5.116 16.113 1.344 5% 9.119 95%
^productivity 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
CEUopportunism 1 5 7 2 5 % 7 95%
L- 0 11.140 30.769 3.582 5 % 18.858 95%
CxRq 0 22.956 99.829 1.785 5% 63.535 95%
MRq 0 33.431 119.572 6.397 5% 64.066 95%
CMRq 0 15.746 47.488 3.853 5% 28.430 95%
Ciawsuits 12.383 81.728 147.260 50.785 5% 112.492 95%
Ccontrov ersy 1 3 4 1 5% 4 95%
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4.1.5 Analysis and Conclusions
As shown in the table, the probability o f failure is very high and is approximately 32 
percent. Moreover, the probability o f financial loss is also very high and, on average, 
there is a 60% chance that the contract results in negative NPV, especially because the 
EU might be able to impose price cuts o f up to 30% of the original price.
Table 8 provides interesting information about the number and percentage of times 
Level-2 risk factors are qualified which, in turn, can provide useful information on the 
root causes o f these risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 4% o f the 
simulation runs there has been no missing requirements.
Table 8. Level-2 risk factors qualification statistics
V ariab le
No o f  
tim e s  n o t 
q u a lifie d
% o f 
tim es  no t 
q ua lifie d
Eunderqualified 26348 65.87
L- 16116 40.29
CxRq 16116 40.29
MRq 1806 4.515
C|VIRq 1806 4.515
^lawsuits 34705 86.7625
^controversy 8948 22.37
According to the regression sensitivity analysis performed to identify the most influential 
risk factors on Financial Loss, Figure 18, EU’s opportunistic behavior, which is a Level-1 
risk factor and is the root cause o f several other risk factors, is the most dangerous risk 
factor, followed by high production costs, represented by Cpr0d, and costs o f missing and
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creeping requirements, CMRq and CXRq, respectively.
DEUopportunism
Total C  prod
CMRq 
CxRq
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients 
Figure 18. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Financial Loss
On the other hand, since on average 33% of the original and creeping requirements o f the 
EU, mostly in terms of time and budget, are not met, and the degree o f controversy is 
most probably “high”, the mean o f Dcontroversy-3, on the defined 1-4 scale, the chances of 
losing the EU and not being able to establish a good reputation, referring to the success of 
such contract, are also relatively high.
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-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients
Figure 19. Regression Sensitivity analysis for probability of failure
According to Figure 19 and considering the fact that controversial relationship is partially 
a result o f missing requirements, it can be concluded that “Missing Requirements” is the 
most influential risk factor that can cause the contract to fail. However, since “Missing 
Requirements” is a Level-2 risk factor, “EU’s opportunistic behavior” and “High 
production costs” are the main root causes o f failure.
As the only controllable Level-1 risk factor whose controlling can potentially save the 
contract is “high production costs”. Assuming that production costs are substantially kept 
low, through for example taking full advantage o f modularity, standardization and 
reusability [1] or moving the production to low-wage areas, according to Figure 19 and 
Table 9, and the definition o f Std b, each 25.11 units decrease in Total Cprod can result in
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0.026 (0.074*0.355) decrease in probability o f failure. This small decrease indicates the
fact that not only Scenario C is the riskiest scenario but also its corresponding risk factors 
are mostly uncontrollable.
Table 9. Summary statistics for probability of failure and production costs o f Scenario C
S ta tis tic
V a lue  fo r  
Fa ilu re  
P ro b a b ility
Value
fo r
. PfiTOd
Minimum 0 8.198
Maximum 1 190.088
Mean 0.316 72.526
Std Dev 0.355 25.112
Variance 0.126 630.619
Skewness 0.800 0.774
Kurtosis 2.055 3.887
Median 0.150 69.350
Mode 0 43.104
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4.2 Scenario A
4.2.1 Description
Scenario A is the second riskiest scenario. In this scenario, similar to Scenario C, the 
MSP provides the EU with a specific service, which means that service under contract is 
a complex, novel service which involves a high degree of asset specificity, for both 
physical and human resources related assets. However, opposite to Scenario C, in this 
scenario the MSP has superior power compared to the EU.
Since the balance o f power is in favor o f the MSP in this scenario, the managerial 
categories o f uncertainties which are hypothetically more significant are uncertainty in 
time, and in information [7] and uncertainty in control is probably less significant. This 
means that the risk factors associated with this scenario probably more controllable.
EADS (Airbus S.A.S.) contracts with many airlines for delivering A380 "supeijumbos" 
can be put in this category, especially considering the fact that EADS’ only competitor 
Boeing had no comparable plane to offer the airlines which gave EADS more bargaining 
power. Manufacturing and delivering the largest passenger airliner in the world has been 
an unprecedented and complex project which has been subject to series o f delays, weight 
problems (missing requirements), and $1.9bn o f over budget (high production costs and 
cost overrun) which, in turn, has lead to customers’ withdrawals (incomplete contracts) 
and has hurt to Airbus image (loss o f image) [22] [32].
Some researchers believe that as the past vertically integrated companies lose their
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manufacturing and other expertise and their ownership of the facilities and process over 
time, the balance of power more and more shifts to the MSPs. This has been the case in, 
for example, electronics where according to a report, as a result of the emergence o f a 
small number o f large CMs, “bargaining power has shifted to tier-one contract 
manufacturers”. These researchers believe that this power structure is also very risky for 
the industry as a whole in terms of profitability [3].
4.2.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the system
Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.
Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
Since in Scenario A, similar to Scenario C, the service under contract is a specific 
service, all risk factors resulted from the attributes o f the service which were modeled for 
Scenario C are applicable here as well.
On the other hand, the fact that the MSP has superior power relative to the EU, can lead 
to two other significant first level risk factors. The first one is MSP’s opportunistic 
behavior, which can be reflected in MSP’s pressurizing the EU for more money and/or 
time, not being responsive enough, lower quality than agreed on in contract, shirking, etc. 
The other risk factor resulted from the MSP’s superior power, according to our definition, 
is that MSP’s management, and consequently staff, do not really care about the contract 
and show low levels o f commitment to its success, as shown in Figure 20.
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Power Structure
Low productivityExcessive schedule pressure
MSP’s opportunistic behavior Low management committment
MSP’s superior power
Leads to ------►
Level-1 rsik factor
Figure 20. Level-1 risk factors resulted from M P’s superior power in Scenario A
Along with the impacts listed in Table 3, listing the impacts o f risk factors resulted from 
the specificity o f the service under contract; the impacts of MSP’s opportunistic behavior 
and low commitment are listed in Table 10.
Table 10. Impacts o f MSP’s opportunistic behavior and low commitment
Risk Factor Effects
MSP’s opportunistic behavior
Low responsiveness, not meeting EU’s 
requirements, and shirking which will ultimately 
leave the EU unsatisfied.
Low commitment Shirking, Low productivity, low responsiveness
Step 3_ Level-2 risk factors
Level-1 risk factors, if  actualized, may give rise to Level-2 risk factors, which are more 
fatal and can directly cause the MSP to fail. Along with Figure 12, which shows Level-2 
risk factors resulted from service attributes,
Figure 21 represents Level-2 risk factors resulted from the actualization o f MSP’s 
opportunistic behavior and low commitment. Again, repetitive relationships which are
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already shown are omitted from these influence diagrams.
Law suits
Conteov^sid*teiadon^^^ 
Cost overrun 1
[ELrTbankn^
Level-2risk factors \
1
MSP’s opportunistic behavior
leads to
Level-1 risk factor | |
Level-2 risk factor n
Figure 21. Level-2 risk factors rooted in MSP’s opportunistic behavior and low
commitment
^ ssofp artn er/lru sty*  (incomplete contract*^ ►^oss^ofimage/reputation^
(FinanciaUoss^
Level-3 risk factors
Level-2 risk factors Missing requirements
Cost overrun Controversial relationship
Law suits
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Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor o
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Figure 22 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how 
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail with respect to its contractual 
relationship with the EU.
fioss of partner /trustV*----- (incomplete contract )  »{joss of image/reputation J
Financial loss I
Level-3 nsk factors
Level-2 nsk factors Missing requirements
jjCon^v^ialrclationshipCost overrun
iN e^tiv^nedia
|ElTsbantaip^^^^^^^^^^rj
leads to -----►
Level-2 risk factor □
Level-3 risk factor o
Figure 22. Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors o f Scenario A
Table 11 summarizes the negative effects of Level-2 risk factor which can potentially 
lead to Level-3 risk factors.
Table 11. The impacts o f Level-2 risk factors in Scenario A 
Risk Factor
Missing requirements 
Cost overrun
Controversial relationship
EU’s bankruptcy or 
financial hardship
Effects
• A percentage o f agreed requirements will not be met
• Renegotiation costs, penalties 
No/little margins gained in the job
• Large number o f sever conflicts
• Conflict resolution costs
EU will not be able to continue business with MSP
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Negative media coverage/ 
word of mouth
• Negative comments about the company in the media
Law suits
(within the industry or mass media)
• Additional publicity, marketing costs
• Bad publicity
• Publicity, court costs and penalties
4.2.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Level-1 risk factors
In this section, similar to what was done for Scenario C, we explain how Level-1 risk
factors are quantified. Since the risk factors resulting from the specificity o f the 
manufacturing service under contract are similar to Scenario C, they are not described in 
this section to avoid redundancy. However, considering the fact that in Scenario A, unlike 
Scenario C, the MSP has superior power, the values assigned to the model parameters in 
the numerical example are considered different, as follows13:
* ^underqualijied 0 .2
*  CPersonnel ~ Noimal(4, 2), CPersonnel- ^
13 Note that as in this scenario, the MSP has more power than the EU, the agreed leasing price, L, is 
considered to be greater, which results in smaller values for mean percentages of costs, compared to 
Scenarios C and F. Also, this superior power will potentially result in less tolerance for costs and 
therefore, smaller values for upper bounds.
• Ctech ~ Normal (6, 4), Ctech=6
•  p {D sch ed u ie=  {l,2,3,4,5,6,7})-( {0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.25,0.2,0.15}) 
® Cschedule  ~ NOTOial(3, 2)
f l  (Dproductivity) commitment'
D productivity  s (14)
’J 2  (D'productivity) Otherwise
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D'productivity has strong negative correlation with degree o f schedule pressure. In the 
example, we c o n s i d e r (Dproductivity) as a Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l)) distribution and f j  
(D produ ctivity)  as a discrete distribution where ? { D p ro ductivity=  {1,2,3,4,5,6,7})= 
(0.15,0.15,0.25,0.2,0.1,0.1,0.05}).
• Low commitment
• Degree o f commitment (D commitm en t)~  1 to 7 scale
In the example, P(Dcommitoe„r={l,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = {0.18,0.2,0.22,0.15,0.1,0.1,0.05})
• MSP’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree o f opportunism (.Duspopponmisn)- 1 to 7 scale
In the example, P ( D MsPopPortmism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7} = {0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.22,0.2,0.18})
Note that as MSP has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism 
and lower degrees o f commitment are considered to be greater. D scheduie is negatively 
correlated with D0pp0rtunism since the MSP can relatively easier get extensions from the 
EU. Also, the MSP can take advantage o f its superior power to make the EU pay an extra 
amount o f money added to the original L (denoted by L+ which follow a f(L+)  distribution 
which is considered to be Normal(8,4) in the example).
Table 12 summarizes how Level-1 risk factors resulting from MSP’s opportunistic 
behavior and Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated. Since MSP’s low 
com m itm ent leads to low productivity  and does not directly to result in  any Level-2 risk  
factor, the table only contains MSP’s opportunistic behaviour.
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Table 12. Relationships between MSP’s opportunistic behavior and Level-2 risk factors
in Scenario A
Level-1 risk factor Level-2 risk factor formulation
MSP’s opportunistic behavior Qualifies L+ and other associated Level-2 risk 
factors (except law suits) if  DMsPomortunism> 4
Level-2 risk factors
In this section, we describe the way Level-2 risk factors are mathematically formulated. 
Again, the risk factors already modeled for Scenario C are omitted and only the two 
Level-2 risk factors unique to Scenario A are described.
• EU’s bankruptcy or financial hardship
• Degree o f EU’s financial difficulty (.DEUHardship)- 1 to 4 scale 
D E U H a d rsh ip  is positively correlated with D o p p o r tm ism  and L + .
• Negative media coverage/word of mouth
• Degree o f negative coverage (D-coverage)- 1 to 4 scale
• Additional publicity costs (added to ex post transaction costs)
' f(CA?) if  D-coverage^ Q
C p r -  " (15)
Otherwise
The 2 random variables are strongly correlated with each other, Dopportunism, MRq and
D co n tro versy
In the simulated example, we consider the following distributions: 
• MRq~ Normal(40, 20), MRql =80, MRq2 =40, MRq3 =30
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• CMRq~ Normal(10, 5)
• D co n tro versy^  B i n 01T lic ll(3 .0.5, s h  1 f t (  1))
• DEuHardship ~ Binomial(3,0.5, shift(l))
• Ciawsuits ~ Normal(50,2 0 )
• L+ ~ Normal(8, 4)
• Cpr ~ Nonnal(20, 8)
• D -coverage ~ Binomial(3,0.5, shift(l))
The second level o f risk factors can directly lead to failure of the contract. The stochastic 
relationships between the second level risk factors and the fatal risk factors, whose 
occurrence mean the failure of the contract, are summarized in Table 13.
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14
Table 13 . Qualification Relationships o f Level-2 risk factors.
Second level risk factor Relationship with Level-3 risk factors
Missing requirements
IF MRq >MRq3 THEN qualifies
• Incomplete contract ( Pj£Rq = 1)
• Loss o f partner ( Pp0Rq =1)
IF MRq >MRq2 15 THEN qualifies
• Loss o f image ( P ^fq = 1)
Cost overrun Already defined
Controversial relationship
IF Dcontroversy ^ '3 THEN qualifies
• Incomplete contract ( p^°ntrmmy= 1)
• Loss o f partner ( )
• Loss o f image ( /^ 7 'rovm> = l)
EU’s bankruptcy or financial 
hardship
IF DEUHardship >=2 THEN qualifies 
.  Loss o f partner (p ^ d sin p y  = J)
• Incomplete Contract( p ^ UHardshiP ==i)
IF DEUHardship >=3 THEN qualifies 
.  Loss o f image ( p^ h m p =\ )
Negative media coverage
IF D.coverage >4 THEN qualifies loss o f image
/  p -c o v e r a g e_i \
\ r LoI l )
Law suits
IF occur at all {Ciawsuits >0) THEN qualifies:
• Negative media coverage
• Incomplete contract ( p ^ wSuUs = \ )
.  Loss o f image ( P “ ft= l)
• Loss o f partner ( p ^ ’Suits = l )
'4 All P  variables are equal to 0 if not qualified.
15 MRql > MRq2 > MRq3
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The probabilities of Level-3 risk factors can be obtained using the following weighted 
sums:
4.2.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
Considering WFLo=0.35; Wjc= 0 A 5 ;  Wl0f= 0.1; WLoi= 0 .4 ,  p=$0.2, and e  =0.005, and that 
production costs (Cprod) follows an N (35, 10) distribution, Cex^post~ N(7,2) and Cex.ante-3 , 
the following results were obtained after running 40,000 simulations.
It should be pointed out that in Scenario A, as a result of MSP’s superior power which, 
according to the definition of power, means better reputation and market position, the 
weight o f Loss o f Image is considered the most followed by Financial Loss and 
Incomplete Contract. On the other hand, as the EU is a relatively weak enterprise with 
less reputation and worse market and economic position, Loss o f Partner is considered 
the least significant element o f failure.
T, _  LawSuits * r%LawSuits . * controversy * jycontroversy _i_ *,MRq * jvMRqPic -  wrc * r IC + w IC * r IC + w lc  * f IC (16)
P ,   LawSuits * n  LawSuits i * Controversy * r>Controversy i *.MRq £ ryMRq
L oP - W LoP !XjP  LoP LoP LoP ^ L o P (17)
D _  *•LawSuits * rtLawSuits . j'E U D ifjicu lty  * nEUDifficulty . ~ Controversy * nControversy . yt.M Rq * ryMRq / i  q \rior- wLoI * r LoI + wLoI ' r LoI + wLoi ] l0i ^  w Loi ?ua
In the simulated example, we consider the following values for the model:
EUHardship
?LoP
,.LawSuits controversy
EUHardship
Lol
ControversyLawSuitsControversy
p -cov erage ...q  ^ 
Lol *
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Figure 23 shows the schematic presentation o f the simulation model for Scenario A.
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Figure 23. Schematic view o f the simulation model for Scenario A
Also, the cost structure is similar to Scenario C, illustrated in Figure 17, except that CXRq 
is replaced by C PR. The results of simulation runs using the sample distributions are 
summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14. Simulation results for the sample problem of Scenario A
N am e M in im u m  M ean M a x im u m  x1 P1 x 2 p2
O u tp u ts
Total C Pro(j 7.183 48.929 97.219 30.536 5% 67.479 95%
Total C ex-post 0.564 32.336 169.909 8.930 5% 107.667 95%
C  total 18.946 84.265 234.118 51.045 5% 160.602 95%
% NPV -132.676 18.206 76.767 -54.758 5% 47.223 95%
FLo 0 0.194 1 0 5% 1 95%
LoP 0 0.559 1 0 5% 1 95%
1C 0 0.274 1 0 5% 1 95%
Lol 0 0.336 1 0 5% 1 95%
F a ilu re
P ro b a b ility
0 0.300 1 0 5% 1 95%
In p u ts
C  Prod 0.180 34.968 74.000 18.360 5% 51.262 95%
^  ex-post 0.002 6.998 15.059 3.703 5% 10.296 95%
"^Personnel 1.0 2.494 4 1 5% 4 95%
^Personnel 0 4.114 12.342 1.077 5% 7.313 95%
p' underqualified 0 0.203 1 0 5% 1 95%
^tech 0.000 6.557 23.944 1.164 5% 12.738 95%
fec h 1 2 4 1 5% 4 95%
^schedule 1 5 7 2 5% 7 95%
^-'schedule 0.000 3.290 11.558 0.597 5% 6.375 95%
Cprcductiv ity 
(Low comitment)
1 3 7 1 5% 6 95%
^productivity 1 4 7 3 5% 6 95%
^MSPopportunism 1 5 7 2 5% 7 95%
L+ 0.011 9.112 24.621 3.172 5% 15.321 95%
^commitment 1 3 7 1 5% 7 95%
MRq 0.006 • 41.550 118.718 11.530 5% 73.5114 95%
C-MRq 0.003 10.433 35.325 2.949 5% 18.329 95%
^lawsuits 17.489 70.492 119.672 47.584 5% 93.244 95%
^controversy 1 3 4 1 5% 4 95%
^EUHardship 1 3 4 1 5% 4 95%
C-cov erage 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
CpR 0.009 11.391 29.996 3.886 5% 19.026 95%
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4.2.5 Analysis and Conclusions
As shown in the table, the probability o f failure is again high and is 30 percent. 
Moreover, the probability o f loss o f partner, LoP, is also high and, on average, in 56% of 
the time, the EU will have less than 50% chance of being able to continue doing business 
with the MSP, mainly as a result of having financial difficulties caused by MSP’s 
opportunistic behavior and additional costs it imposes on the EU, denoted by L+.
The probability of financial loss is also relatively high and, on average, in approximately 
19% of the time, the contract does not result in the desired profit, at least 10%, even 
though the MSP might be able to impose additional costs of up to 25% of the original 
price on the EU. The probabilities o f incomplete contract and loss o f image are also 
rather high, on average in 27 and 33 percent o f the time above 50%, respectively.
Table 15 provides interesting information about the number and percentage of times 
Level-2 risk factors are qualified which, in turn, can provide useful information on the 
root causes o f these risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 40% of the 
simulation runs L+ is not qualified, which means that there is a 60% chance that the MSP 
ask for more money that what originally agreed on in the contract.
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Table 15. Qualification statistics of Level-2 risk factors in Scenario A
V a r ia b le
No o f 
t im e s  n o t 
q u a lif ie d
% o f 
t im e s  n o t 
q u a lif ie d
D
' underqualified 21795 54.4875
L+ 15862 39.655
MRq 1199 2.9975
OviRq 1199 2.9975
^lawsuits 35279 88.1975
^controversy 15862 39.655
t^EUHardship 15862 39.655
D-cov erage 15779 39.4475
As mentioned before, loss o f image is the most important risk factor for the MSP in this 
scenario, and the regression sensitivity analysis indicates that its main reason is “MSP’s 
opportunistic behavior” and “Negative media coverage/word o f mouth”. The threat of 
MSP’s opportunistic behavior is further realized when it is identified as the first and most 
important reason o f failure (Figure 24).
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I^MSPopportunism 
D-coverage
^controversy
MRq
^EUHardship
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients 
Figure 24. Regression Sensitivity Analysis for Loss o f image in Scenario A
According to the tornado graph in Figure 25, MSP’s opportunistic behavior, and high 
production costs are the most influential Level-1 risk factors on the probability o f failure. 
As mentioned before, both of these risk factors can be practically controlled. In practice, 
MSPs have begun to recognize the importance o f controlling opportunistic behavior and 
in many sectors, such as, for example, electronics, successful MSPs seek collaborative, 
long-term partnerships with their EUs [3]. In fact, a significant industry trend in recent 
years has been moving from single contracts to partnerships and risk sharing 
arrangements [20].
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DMSPopportunism 
^controversy 
D-coverage
MRq 
Total Cprod
^EUHardship
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients
Figure 25. Regression Sensitivity Analysis for Failure Probability in Scenario A
If we assume that the MSP’s opportunistic behavior is controlled, for example in a highly 
regulated environment or through long-term, collaborative arrangements, the probability 
of failure is radically decreased. According to the two tornado graphs, Table 16 and 
definition o f Std b, probability o f failure and loss of image can be reduced by 
approximately 0.19 (0.520*0.357) and 0.23 (0.478* 0.473), respectively, if  DMSPopportunhm 
is decreased by one Std Dev, i.e. 1.756.
According to Figure 25, “high production costs”, denoted by Cprod, is the second most 
influential Level-1 risk factor on the probability o f failure. Assuming that production 
costs are substantially kept low, through for example taking full advantage o f modularity,
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standardization and reusability [1] or moving the production to low-wage areas, and 
running the simulation again the probability o f failure can be cut down by 0.035 
(0.357*0.098), for each 11.27 units decrease in production costs.
Table 16. Summary statistics for Scenario A
S ta tis tic
V a lue  fo r  
F a ilu re  
P ro b a b ility
Value
fo r
LoP
Value fo r
Cprod
V alue  fo r
D|VISPopportunism
Minimum 0 0 7.183 1
Maximum 1 1 97.219 7
Mean 0.300 0.336 48.929 4.710
Std Dev 0.357 0.472 11.270 1.756
Variance 0.127 0.223 127.019 3.086
Skewness 0.862 0.693 0.0277 -0.461
Kurtosis 2.281 1.480 2.987 2.233
Median 0.100 0 48.845 5
Mode 0 0 31.431 5
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4.3 Scenario F
4.3.1 Description
Scenario F is the third riskiest scenario. In this case, similar to Scenario C, the balance of 
power is in favor o f the EU and unlike both scenarios A and C, the MSP provides the EU 
with a standard, commodity service.
Similar to Scenario C, since the balance o f power is in favor o f the EU, all managerial 
categories o f uncertainties, i.e. uncertainty in time, in information, and in control[7], are 
significant and have to be considered. Thus, risk factors associated with this scenario are 
also less likely to be controllable.
In electronics, most o f the arrangements Contract Manufacturers (CM) or Electronics 
Manufacturing Services (EMS) (which CMs have evolved to) are involved in can be 
categorized under this category. There are several rival large CM or EMS companies who 
all offer a more or less similar set of manufacturing services to Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM) which are mostly well-established market players with strong 
market position and brand names (companies such as, for example, HP, Microsoft and 
Cisco). Their business is often a risky, low margin business which is always potentially 
threatened by new disruptive technologies.
4.3.2 Identifying Risk Factors and Modeling the System
Step 1_ Level-3 risk factors
Already completed in 3.5.1.
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Step 2_ Level-1 risk factors
Since in Scenario F, similar to Scenario C, the balance of power is favor o f the EU, all 
risk factors resulted from the power structure, which were modeled for Scenario C, are 
applicable here as well and, therefore, are not repeated in this section.
On the other hand, the fact that the service provided by the MSP is not a specific service 
and can be considered a mature commodity service which can be also provided by many 
other MSPs dictates other risk factors as illustrated in Figure 26.
Financial pressure
Competitors’ lower price
Level-1 risk factors
Service attributes
Commodity Service
Disruptive technology
Creeping requirements
Competitors’ better quality
Competitors’ 
more utility
E xcessive schedule pressure
Mature Service
Leads to -------►
L evel-1 rsik factor
16
Figure 26. Level-1 risk factors resulted from service attributes in Scenario F
A disruptive technology or disruptive innovation, an expression coined by Clayton M. 
Christensen and used in contrast with sustaining technology or innovation, is “a
A  com m odity service is a non-com plex, w hich is not very asset specific or time sensitive.
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technological innovation, product, or service that eventually overturns the existing 
dominant technology or status quo product in the market.” It dominates an existing 
market by either filling a role in a new market that the older technology could not fill (for 
example more expensive, lower capacity but smaller-sized hard disks used in newly 
developed notebook computers in the 1980s) or by successively performance until finally 
replacing the older technology (as digital photography has begun to replace film 
photography) [22].
The impacts o f the identified Level-1 risk factors are listed in Table 17.
Table 17. Impacts o f Level-1 risk factors of Scenario F
Risk Factor Effects
Competitors’ better quality • EU’s financial pressure
• EU’s creeping requirements[7]Competitors’ lower price
Competitors’ more utility
Disruptive technology
EU’s new expectations asking for new 
technology
EU’s opportunistic behavior
Time and cost pressure, creeping requirements 
[7], overdependence on the EU
Step 3_ Level-2 risk  factors
Level-1 risk factors, if  actualized, give rise to the second level o f risk factors, which can 
directly cause the MSP to fail.
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H  Law suits
Cost overrunControversial relationship
Level-2risk factors
Level-1 risk factors
leads to 
Level-1 risk factor
Level-2 risk factor □
Low productivity
Financial pressure
Disruptive technology Creeping requirements
Excessive schedule pressure
Figure 27. Level-2 risk factors o f Scenario F
Even though the identified Level-2 risk factors in Scenario F are similar to the ones 
identified in Scenario C and, therefore, they will have the same effects (Table 3), the risk 
factors associated with each scenario should be quantified and modeled differently since 
they are rooted in different sources.
Figure 28 represents the relationship between Level-2 and Level-3 risk factors and how 
realization o f Level-2 risk factors can cause the MSP to fail in its contractual relationship 
with the EU.
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Level-2 risk factors
Level-3 risk factors
■Financial
Cost over
Joss of image/reputation
(joss of partner J y  .
incomplete contract
^ o n to v e r^ lre M o n s h ^ ^ jMissing requirements
leads to
Level-2 risk factor 
Level-3 risk factor
Figure 28. Level-2 and Level-3 Risk factors in Scenario F
4.3.3 Quantifying Risk Factor Uncertainties
Level-1 risk factors
In this section, we explain the way Level-1 risk factors are quantified. Considering the 
impacts and implications of each risk factor a number o f random variables are defined to 
quantify each risk factor. Also, an example distribution is considered for each random 
variable to be used in the example simulation runs. Again the risk factors already 
modeled for Scenario C are omitted to avoid redundancy.
• Disruptive technology
• Disruptive Technology occurrence (DisTech where PDisTech= PoisTech)
In the example, PoisTech is considered equal to 0.01.
• Competitors’ lower price
• Competitors’ price (PCOmp~f (Pcomp))
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In the exam ple,/(P COmp) is set to Normal (100,10), which implies that the average price 
of the competitors is the same as your leasing price.
• Competitors’ better quality
• Competitors’ quality ( Q COm p~  1 to7 scale17)
In the example, it is assumed that Q COmp follows a Binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l)) 
distribution.
• Competitors’ more utility
• Competitors’ lead-time (LTcomp~ 1 to7 scale)
• Competitors’ peripheral services (PScomp ~ 1 to7 scale)
In the example, it is assumed that both LTcomp and PScomp follow a Binomial (6, 0.5,
shift(l)) distribution.
• EU’s opportunistic behavior
• Degree o f EU’s opportunism (.D EuoPPortunism~ 1 to 7 scale)
Note that as EU has superior power, the probabilities o f higher degrees o f opportunism 
are considered to be greater. D  schedule is positively correlated with D opportmjsm since the EU 
can pressurize the MSP to complete what is committed to do in shorter time. In the 
example, P (D EuoPPortunism ={1,2,3,4,5,6,7}) = {0.05,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.23,0.22,0.2}).
• Creeping requirements
• Costs of extra requirements (CxRq ~ f (CxRq)) (added to production costs and is
17 The com parative 1 to 7 scale is defined as follows:
1: m uch worse, 2: worse, 3: rather worse, 4: same, 5: rather better, 6: better, 7: m uch better
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qualified if DisTech 1 or D o p p o r tu n is m ^ ^  or Q c o m p  '>4 or P S c o m p '>4.)
M if  DisTech=\
CxRq-* (19)
~f (CxRq) Otherwise
where M is a large number. This ensures that if  a disruptive technology comes around, 
assuming that the MSP will not be able to offer that immediately, it certainly will not be 
able to provide the EU with its new requirements.
CxRq, in the absence o f disruptive technology, qualifies MRq if  it is greater than CxRq- 
Also, CxRq is strongly correlated with MRq, Q COmp  and P S comp  and is added to production 
costs. In the numerical example,/(C x p f  is assumed to be exponential 15) and CxRg=0.
• Financial pressure
• The imposed price cut on the MSP (L~), defined as a percentage o f original L, 
leasing price stated in the original contract, defined as follows:
r
' ' f l f a  )  i f  DEUopportunism?* 4 OR Pcomp * ' 8 5
L 'H (20)
 ^~ /(X  )  Otherwise
Obviously, the mean o f f ( L  )  is greater than the mean of / (X  ). In the example, f ( L  )  
a n d /(X )  are considered as Normal(10, 5) and Normal(5,2), respectively. X" has strong 
negative correlation with P COmp ■ CxRq and X are qualified if D E uopportunism>  4.
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• Excessive schedule pressure [7]
• Degree o f schedule pressure (DSCheduie ~1 to 7 scale).
ffl (Dschedule )  
J 2 (D sc h e d u le  )
EUopportunism
Otherwise
,< 4 AND L T cnmn<5co p
(21)
• Total % cost to make up schedule pressure which MSP incurs if  Dscheduie >4
These two random variables are positively correlated; Dscheduie is also positively correlated 
with L T comp and CxRq. In the example, we consider f i ( D SCheduie)  as a binomial (6, 0.5, 
shift(l)) distribution and f 2(DSCheduie) as a discrete distribution where
• Qcheduie- Norm al(2,1)
Defining Dscheduie as described above, insures higher probabilities for actualization of 
excessive schedule pressure in case the EU behaves opportunistically or the competitors 
provide the same service with shorter lead times.
• Low Productivity[7][10]
• Degree of productivity {Dproductivity)- 1 to 7 scale
Dproductivity has strong negative correlation with D scheduie, C XRq and L \  D EUopportunism. In the 
example, we consider that D productivity follows a binomial (6, 0.5, shift(l)) distribution.
{.Cschedule ~  . / (  C schedu le))  
V (D sc h e d u ie =  { 1 ,2,3,4,5,6,7 }) = {0.05,0.1 ,0.1,0.1 5,0.25,0.2,0.15 }.
86
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The rest o f the model is similar to that o f Scenario C, except the following differences:
• Missing requirements
• % of requirements missed (MRq)
f  100 if  DisTech=l
MRq =■ (22)
- f  (MRq) Otherwise
• Costs of missing requirements (CMRq ~  f  (CMRq )) (added to ex post transaction 
costs)
'  0 if  DisTech=l or MRq=0
CMRq =-( (23)
^ ~ f ( C MRq) Otherwise
In the absence of disruptive technology, these two random variables are strongly 
correlated with each other, Dopportunism, Dscheduie and XRq.
• Law suits
• Additional court costs (Clawsuits) (added to ex post transaction costs)
f  (^Cla w su its) if  22controversy 4 Or (IVlRq ^  \4Rq\ and l  ^'is lcch 0)
Clawsuits < (24)
^ 0 Otherwise
Ciawsuit is strongly correlated with MRq and f  (Clawsuits) is considered Normal (70, 20) in 
the example.
Moreover, as invention o f a disruptive technology is a radical change that can potentially 
change all the equations, we need to change some o f the w  multipliers as follows:
0 if  DisTech-\
(25)
0.1 Otherwise
Controversy 
LoP =<
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r i
LoP =-<
0.5
i f  D isTech=\
Otherwise
(26)
w.. LawSuitsLoP
0.4
if  DisTech=\
Otherwise
(27)
w,...LawSuitsLol
0.4
if  DisTech=\
Otherwise
(28)
, J Controversy 
L o l = <
0.1
if  DisTech= 1
Otherwise
(29)
r  i
MRq
L o l =  i
0.5
if  DisTech- 1
Otherwise
(30)
Different formulations in the case o f disruptive technology ensure that in case of 
disruptive technology, the short term interests o f the MSP with regard to the contract 
under study (profit margin and completing the contract) are not endangered as much as 
its long-term benefits (continuing business with the EU and keeping its image and 
market share). This is especially important since we have assumed that time horizon of
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the contract is short.
Thus, since disruptive technology is such a radical change that requires a different 
model, two different models are simulated in parallel to reflect what is likely to happen 
in reality. One model assesses the probability o f success if the dominance o f the current 
technology offered by the MSP remains untouched during the time horizon o f the 
contract, and the other one attempts to assess MSP’s chances o f success in case a 
disruptive technology gains dominance in this period. Simulating these two models as 
the two states the system may have with different probabilities allows for a more realistic 
risk assessment process.
Similar to Scenario C, the probabilities o f Level-3 risk factors are calculated as follows:
r> , A,LawSuits * ry LawSuits _±_ „, controversy & jjcontroversy j_  , t MRq * jyMRqn c = w IC * PIC + w,c *p[C + wIC *pic
7-)   LawSuits * d LawSuits , Controversy & -[^Controversy , „, MRq * jyMRqr lop -  wLoP * iJLoF + wLoP * pLoP + wLoP
7-)___ „, LawSuits a  r \  LawSuits , ,, Controversy * r>Controversy _ i_  _t MRq * ryMRq
F l o i - w LoI *PLoI + w LoI PLoI +  wLoI PLn[
Also, we consider the following values for the model parameters:
e=$5; PIC = PLoP= PLoI =0.5; MRql=50; M Rql =20; w“ 'ft=0.5;
wfcRq= 0.2andM =100.
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4.3.4 Propagating the Uncertainties
40,000 simulations were run assuming that W f/jO= 0 .3 ;  Wjc= 0 .1 5 ;  WLof = 0 .4 ;  Wil0f=  0.15, 
p=$0.5 [11], e =0.005, Cex.ante=8, and that production costs (Cprod) follows an N(25, 5) 
distribution and Cex.post~H {l,4)-
Figure 29 shows the schematic presentation o f the simulation model. The cost structure is 
also the same as that o f Scenario C.
EUopporlunism
Level-1 comp comp
Monte
Carlo
samples
PSc1comp
\DisTec-...... -yj......
Level-2
Monte
Carlo
samples
—| iscontroversy
Level-3
Monte
Carlo
samples
Lol J CLoP
■ T f c  ▼  A -
Cost item
Correlation ^
Qualification -A------
Figure 29. Schematic view o f Scenario F simulation model
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Since the contracted service is a commodity service, production costs are considered less 
than the other two scenarios. Also, the main objective o f the MSP is considered satisfying 
the EU so that it continues leasing MSP’s services and does not switch to other similar 
MSPs. This is the reason why Wfj0p is considered the greatest of other weights, which are 
assumed to be o f equal importance.
Table 18 represents the results o f simulating the developed model for Scenario F, using 
the sample distributions.
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Table 18. Simulation results for Scenario F numeric example
N am e M in im u m M ean M a x im u m x i P1 x 2 P2
O u tp u ts
Total C  prod 7.558 41.075 142.931 21.272 5% 75.360 95%
Total C  ex-post 0.002 27.783 194.870 5.303 5% 108.575 95%
C  MSP 14.967 71.858 290.839 33.831 5% 158.709 95%
%  N P V -262.569 14.426 66.916 -80.776 5% 51.833 95%
FLo 0 0.219 1 0 5% 1 95%
LoP 0 0.283 1 0 5% 1 95%
1C 0 0.118 1 0 5% 1 95%
Lol 0 0.283 1 0 5% 1 95%
F a ilu re
P ro b a b ility
0 0.239 1 0 5% 1 95%
In p u ts
C Prod 4.416 25.024 44.822 16.814 5% 33.26075 95%
^  ex-post 0.001 7.352 22.662 1.601 5% 13.67758 95%
DisTech 0 0.0107 1 0 5% 0 95%
P
' comp 59.055 100.026 147.508 83.383 5% 116.538 95%
Qcom p 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
t-TCOm p 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
P 's1 °co m p 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
^schedule 1.000 4 7 2 5% 5 95%
^schedule 1 5 7 2 5% 7 95%
^schedule 0.004 2.204 6.257 0.697 5% 3.788 95%
^productivity 1 4 7 2 5% 6 95%
^EUopportunism 1 5 7 2 5% 7 95%
L-i 0.002 5.106 12.925 1.960 5% 8.253 95%
t-"2 0.017 11.382 29.328 3.671 5% 19.398 95%
^XRq 0 .0 0 0 16.721 99.361 1.297 5% 46.825 95%
MRq 0.038 21.106 58.444 5.946 5% 36.904 95%
OviRq 0.002 12.004 47.222 2.045 5% 23.912 95%
^lawsuits 5.290 82.764 156.334 49.640 5% 115.262 95%
^controversy 1 3 4 1 5% 4 95%
4.3.5 Analysis and Conclusions
The simulation results (Table 18) indicate that there is an approximately 22% chance that 
the contract bring in no financial profit and there is 24% chance o f failure. Also, there is a
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28% chance that the EU switches to other similar MSPs, with the probability o f 50%, 
after completing this contract.
Table 19 contains useful information on the number and percentage o f times Level-2 risk 
factors are not qualified and can provide useful information on the root causes o f these 
risk factors. For instance, the statistics show that only in 17% o f the simulation runs extra 
requirements in addition to what mentioned in the original contract are not imposed on 
the MSP (creeping requirements). Also, there is only 11% chance that there are no 
missing requirements.
Table 19. Level-2 risk factors qualification statistics in Scenario A
V a r ia b le
No o f 
t im e s  n o t 
q u a lif ie d
% o f  
t im e s  n o t 
q u a lif ie d
CxRq 7 1 2 4 17.81
MRq 4 5 0 1 11.2525
^MRq 4 5 0 1 11.2525
^lawsuits 3 5 2 7 4 88.185
Dqontrov ersy 5 4 4 9 13.6225
Figure 30 illustrates the results of performing regression sensitivity analysis on “Loss o f 
Partner”.
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^controversy
0.474
MRq
0.423
DisTech
0.168
EUopportunism
0.101
CXRq -0.048
teomp 0.043
p s ,'comp 0.04
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients 
Figure 30. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Loss o f Partner in Scenario F
As expected, one o f the main reasons for losing the EU is that the MSP will not be able to 
meet all EU’s short-term and long-term requirements. Given that we can trace back 
missing requirements to MSP’s competition, disruptive technology and EU’s 
opportunistic behavior, and that “controversial relationship” is also rooted in EU’s 
opportunistic behavior, it can be concluded that EU’s Opportunistic behavior amplified 
by MSP’s competitors and emergence o f a disruptive technology are the most significant 
reasons for loss o f partner. In fact, these two risk factors are also the main reasons of 
MSP’s failure (Figure 31).
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'controversy 0.577
MRq 0.316
DisTech 0.195
EUopportunism 0.123
'XRq 0.094
•comp 0.064
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Std b Coefficients
Figure 31. Regression Sensitivity analysis for Failure Probability in Scenario F
The analysis shows that the risk factors associated with Scenario F are the least 
controllable o f the three scenarios. Figure 31 shows that even high production costs, 
Cpmd, is not a major reason for failure. However, it should be kept substantially low in 
order to to stay competitive and to keep MSP’s services attractive to the EUs.
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CHAPTER5 Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Comparison of Scenarios
In this section the simulation results o f the three scenarios are compared and analyzed. 
Even though the numerical examples are based on made up data, the distributions used in 
the simulations are designed in a way to be reasonably realistic. Table 20 summarizes the 
distributions used in the simulated numerical example; the random variables common 
between more than one scenario are shaded to be distinguishable.
Table 20. Distributions used in scenarios
^ \ S c e n a r i o
V a r ia b le ^ \.
c A
l l i i i S i i S i i i i H
F
6  . \ -Mill 5 ■>
Cex-post N( 10,4) N(7.2) N(7.4)|
C prod N(40,15) N(35.10) N(25,5)
Tpersonnel Binomial(3, 0.5, 
Shi 11(1))
Binomial(3. 0.5, 
Shi 11(1))
(-^Personnel X(5, 2) N(4.2)
u^nder qualified
0.1 0.3
l3inomial(3, 0.5. 
Shift(l))
Binomial(3, 0.5. 
Shift(l))
('tech N(8, 5) N(6,4)
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^ \ S c e n a r i o
V a r i a b l e s .
c A F
Dschedule P C  1 . 2 . 3 , 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 1 ) = P C  1 , 2 . 3 , 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 }  ) - I F ( / 7 / 1  appntnumm < ' 4
! 0 . 0 5 . 0 . 0 5 . 0 . 1 . 0 . 1 5 , { 0 . 0 5 , 0 . 1 . 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 5 . 0 . &  LTcomp < = 4 ) ,
0 . 2 3 . 0 . 2 2 . 0 . 2 1 2 5 , 0 . 2 . 0 . 1 5 1 B i n o m i a l ( 6 .  0 . 5 .  
S h i f l ( l ) .  e l s e  
P (  j  1 , 2 . 3 , 4 . 5 . 6 , 7 j ) =  
1 0 . 0 5 . 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 5 . 0 .  
2 5 . 0 . 2 , 0 . 1 5 ]
Cschedule N ( 5 .  2 . 5 ) N ( 3 . 2 ) N ( 2 . 1 )
Dproductivity B i n n m i a l ( 6 .  0 . 5 . I I  /)l finmiln\‘ u ' - 4 . B i n o m i a l ( 6 .  0 . 5 .
' i t  "f
S h i t t ( l ) )
Is?-:;-::.:..:J5jt.::.,V' >!<■ Is^Hj:V-,:■■ ,;PS4.:'  O i i l ; ».
' T i f f i n
P C  1 . 2 , 3 . 4 , 5 , 6 . 7 } ) =  
1 0 . 1 5 . 0 . 1 5 , 0 . 2 5 . 0 . 2 ,  
0 . 1 , 0 . 1 . 0 . 0 5 } .  e l s e  
B i n o m i a l ( 6 .  0 . 5 ,  
S l i i l l (  1 ) )
S h i  1 1 ( 1 ) )
I-h.l 'opi-onuni^m P ( {  1 . 2 , 3 , 4 . 5 , 6 , 7 } )  
{ 0 . 0 5 , 0 . 1 . 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 5 . 0 .  
2 2 , 0 . 2 , 0 . 1 8 }
P C  1 . 2 . 3 , 4 . 5 , 6 , 7 } )  
: i ) . n s . u . u 5 . n . i . o . i 5 .
( >  2 ' . i  1 . 2 2 . 0 . 2 ;
m m SSSSm I t  (  Hl-.Vnpiwrtunism < ' 4 ,  
( i f  ( / W  > 9 0  &  
( W O ) .  N ( 5 , 2 ) ,  
e l s e  \ (  I O o ) ) e U e  O
1 \ | i o i i e i i i i . i l ( 2 0 ) 1 x p o n e n i i a l t  1 5 )
MRq N ( 3 0 . 2 0 ) N ( 4 0 . 2 0 ) N ( 2 0 . 1 0 )
(- WA\/ M (  1 5 , 8 ) N ( 1 0 , 5 ) N ( 1 0 , 8 )
r lawsuits N ( 7 0 . 2 0 ) N ( 0 ( ) . l  5 ) N ( 7 5 . 2 0 )
D controversy B i n o m i a l ( 3 .  0 . 5 . B i n o m i a l ( 3 .  0 . 5 ,
. = . , ' .L.4 P i p f 4 ; . - :  P i p p '  ■ ■ ■■■..4: :P # P : B i n o m i a l ( 3 ,  0 . 5 .
S h i l t ( l ) ) S h i t t ( l ) ) S h i l ' t ( l ) )
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^ " \S c e n a r io
V a ria b le ^ \.
c A F
DMSPopportunism P({1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=
{0.05,0.1,0.1,0.15,0.
22,0.2,0.18}
L+ N(8,4)
Dcommitment P({1,2,3,4,5,6,7})=
{0.18,0.2,0.22,0.15,
0.1,0.1,0.05}
DEUHardship Binomial(3, 0.5, 
Shift(l))
P -coverage Binomial(6, 0.5, 
Shift(l))
CpR N(10,5)
PoisTech 0.01
Pcomp N(100,10)
Qcomp Binomial(6, 0.5, 
Shift(l))
LTcomp Binomial(6, 0.5, 
Shift(l))
PS comp Binomial(6, 0.5, 
Shift(l))
For instance, it is assumed that Cproci has the smallest mean and standard deviation in 
Scenario F since the manufacturing service contracted in this scenario involves low 
degrees o f asset specificity, and, therefore, requires less investment and enjoys higher 
economy scales and salvage value for the manufacturing facilities. This is also due to the 
fact that the manufacturing service in this scenario is a commodity, mature service.
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However, C p ro d  is not considered too low since the leasing price o f the service, L, cannot 
be too high because o f the competitive market and because the EU is in a better 
bargaining position.
The simulation results are consistent with the hypothesis mentioned in [14], and the 
probability o f failure in Scenario C is the most, followed closely by Scenario A, and 
lastly Scenario F. Table 21 summarizes the summary o f results obtained from simulating 
the numerical examples of the three scenarios.
Table 21. Three Scenarios results summary
Scenario
O utput
C A F
Probability o f failure 32% 30% 24%
Main failure root cause EU’s opportunistic 
behaviour
MSP’s
opportunistic
behaviour
EU’s opportunistic 
behaviour
Most influential risk 
factor
Controversial
relationship
MSP’s
opportunistic
behaviour
Controversial
relationship
Interestingly, in all the three scenarios, even in scenarios C and A, where the 
manufacturing service contracted is a highly specific one, the most influential risk factor 
is not high production costs but it is the opportunistic behavior o f the more powerful 
party. The potential long-term and short-term threats o f controversial relationships 
resulting from one party’s opportunistic behavior, shirking, and pressuring are widely 
known and many pieces o f research are focused on finding ways to manage and control
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these risk factors (e.g. [3][6][8]). This is also consistent with current industry trends in 
sourcing arrangements which is moving towards partnerships and joint ventures to set off 
the effects o f lack o f balance and help both partners benefit equally from the contract 
(e.g. [3] [20][34][ 14]).
5.2 Recommendations and Future Research
The main limitation of this research is probably the fact the simulations rely on arbitrary 
data. To overcome this and to further streamline this research, the following can be done:
• Evaluating the real performance o f the model through applying on real-life data
• Completing the model to incorporate internal risk factors as well as external ones
• Using agent-based modeling to simulate Scenario F which is highly influenced by 
the behaviour of autonomous competitors
• Developing a comprehensive risk assessment model which simultaneously 
considers both actors and studied the risk factors threatening the probability o f a 
win-win contract which benefits both parties in long-term
• Completing the definition of failure by incorporating other Level-3 risk factors, 
such as loss o f intellectual property
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APPENDIX A
Rank Order Correlation
The rank order coefficient was developed by Spearman in early 1900’s. It is calculated 
based on the rankings o f values, i.e. their position within the min-max range of their 
possible values, without making any assumptions about the distribution of the variables, 
and not the actual values themselves[29]. The rank order coefficient, usually denoted by 
p, is a number between -1 and +1, where -1 means a perfect negative correlation, 1 
indicates a perfect positive correlation and a p value between -0.5 and 0.5 indicates a 
week correlation [35].
@RISK allows for creating rank order correlation matrices using its RISKCORRMAT 
function. It generates rank-correlated pairs o f sampled values in a two step process prior 
to simulation, as follows:
1. It generates a set o f randomly distributed "rank scores" for each variable. For 
example, if  n iterations are to be run, n scores are generated for each variable. In fact, 
rank scores are simply values of varying magnitude between a minimum and 
maximum. These rank scores are then rearranged to give pairs o f scores which 
generate the desired rank correlation coefficient. In each simulation run, there is a 
pair o f scores, one score for each variable.
2. It generates a set o f random numbers (between 0 and 1) to be used in for each 
variable. A gain , i f  there are n sim ulation runs, n random numbers are generated for 
each variable. These random numbers are then ranked in increasing order. For each 
variable, the smallest random number is then used in the iteration with the smallest 
rank score, the second smallest random number is used in the iteration with the
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second smallest rank score and so on. This ordering based on ranking continues for 
all random numbers until the largest random number is used with the largest rank 
score.
The result o f this procedure is a set o f paired random numbers that can be used in 
sampling values from the correlated distributions in each iteration o f the simulation[29]. 
When setting up a correlation matrix, it is very important to make sure that the resulting 
matrix is not invalid and is self-consistent. An invalid matrix involves inconsistent 
simultaneous relationships between three or more inputs. For instance, if  input A and B 
are correlated with a coefficient of +1, B and C with a coefficient o f +1, and C and A 
with a coefficient o f -1, the resulting correlation matrix will be oclearly invalid[29]. 
@RISK can correct any invalid matrix and generate the closest valid matrix to the 
entered invalid one.
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